Corporate Diversification and Stock Returns by Isakovski, Tatiana
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration College of Business (Strome)
Spring 2003
Corporate Diversification and Stock Returns
Tatiana Isakovski
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Isakovski, Tatiana. "Corporate Diversification and Stock Returns" (2003). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old Dominion
University, DOI: 10.25777/3pw6-7461
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/29
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND STOCK RETURNS
by
Tatiana Isakovski 
Old Dominion University, 2003
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
FINANCE 





R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ABSTRACT
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND STOCK RETURNS
Tatiana Isakovski 
Old Dominion University, 2003 
Chair: Dr. Kenneth Yung
There are considerable empirical evidences in favor of and against the corporate 
diversification. A number of previous studies have found that industrial and geographic 
diversification have a negative effect on the value of the firm and the stock returns. In 
contrast, a growing stream of literature provides evidence in support of the diversification 
premium. There is no consensus on whether the documented discount can be attributed to 
corporate diversification per se or to the firms’ characteristics other than diversification. 
In this study, we re-examine the impact of industrial and/or geographic diversification on 
the stock returns.
The investigation of the comprehensive sample of publicly traded firms over the 
last 20 years reveals that industrially diversified firms do not under-perform. While they 
are systematically different from single-segment firms, we did not uncover any abnormal 
performance that can be attributed to the industrial diversification per se. In addition, we 
find evidence in support of the previous studies about the beneficial effect of geographic 
diversification. Our results suggest that, in 1990s, industrially focused firms with 
operations abroad were rewarded more than purely domestic firms. This result is robust 
to the model specification and does not change whether the four-factor model or the 
characteristic-based model is used.
However, the examination of corporate diversification events -  mergers and 
acquisitions -  reveals different picture with respect to industrial diversification. Our 
results suggest that acquisitions of independent firms outside of existing lines of business 
have a negative effect on shareholder value. Annual average buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for firms acquiring targets in unrelated lines of business is about 15% more 
negative than that of firms acquiring targets in related lines of business. Pre-merger 
targets’ performance or differences in firm-specific characteristics cannot explain this 
post-merger return difference. Moreover, post-merger return changes cannot be explained 
by mergers’ characteristics, such as transaction size, method of payment or acquisition 
premia. Furthermore, examination of cumulative monthly abnormal returns reveals that 
although acquiring firms in both related and unrelated mergers experience post-merger 
returns decline, the performance o f unrelated firms deteriorates much faster in unrelated 
than in related acquisitions.
The overall results can be summarized as follows. Corporate diversification 
changes the nature of the firm. Not only the composition of the firm becomes different, 
the overall firm’s risk characteristics change. Thus, corporate diversification has an 
impact on firm value through changes of the firm’s characteristics. Moreover, corporate 
diversification per se becomes an important firm characteristic that affects stock returns 
in addition to other firm-specific characteristics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A number of studies (see Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), 
Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), and Servaes (1996), among others) have found that 
industrial diversification has a strong negative effect on the value of the firm. 
Furthermore, consistent with the diversification discount literature, Dennis, Dennis and 
Yost (2002) present new evidence that even global diversification leads to the 
significant value loss. In contrast, a growing stream of literature provides evidences in 
support of the diversification premium and questions the diversification discount studies 
on the grounds of incorrect econometric methodology, improper matching technique, 
selection bias, endogenety problems, differences in leverage etc. (Hubbard and Palia 
(1999), Matsusaka (1993, 2001), Chevalier (2000), Villalonga (2000), Whited (2001), 
Campa and Kedia (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), 
Schoar (2002)). Thus, there is no consensus on whether corporate diversification 
destroys value or whether it is the optimal business strategy, which depends on the 
specific firms’ characteristics and time.
Several hypotheses were advanced in the literature in order to explain the 
diversification discount. One hypothesis attributes the discount to the value-destroying 
effect of inefficient internal capital markets (Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). Another explains the discount by the agency 
problem (Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Dennis, Dennis and Sarin (1997), May (1995), 
Agarwal and Samwick (2002), Anderson, Bates, Bizjak and Lemmon (2000)). 
Furthermore, other researchers have argued that industrial diversification discount can
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be partially explained by differences in the required returns (Lamont and Polk, 2002), 
by geographic diversification (Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999), Dennis, Dennis and 
Yost (2002)), or by low value of the acquired business (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf 
(2002)). However, neither hypothesis provides a complete explanation of why 
conglomerates are valued less relative to specialized firms.
A negative relation between corporate diversification and firm value suggests 
that stock returns of diversified firms should be affected as well. Consistent with 
diversification discount literature, Comment and Jarrell (1995) document negative 
abnormal returns associated with increase in diversification. However, in the 
multivariate pooled time-series cross-sectional regression that investigates the relation 
between stock returns and changes in the degree of focus, the coefficient estimate for 
focus change is reliably positive only in the presence of accounting performance 
variables. In contrast, Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2001) find acquiring firms’ stocks 
experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement of diversifying 
acquisition, indicating market views these acquisitions as value enhancing. In addition, 
12-months buy-and-hold returns after diversifying acquisition is not statistically and 
economically different from zero.
Lamont and Polk (2001) find that not all diversified firms are traded at a 
discount. Moreover, the diversification discount varies with returns. However, 
difference in expected returns explains only about 50% of the discount. Furthermore, 
the diversification discount is hard to reconcile with findings of positive abnormal 
returns to diversifying acquisitions (Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Matsusaka (1993),
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3
Hubbard and Palia (1999), Chevalier (1999)). Thus, the empirical evidences on whether 
corporate diversification is sub-optimal business strategy are inconclusive.
In this study, we analyze stock returns of diversified versus specialized firms in 
an attempt to solve this puzzle. First, we concentrate on the long-term stocks 
performance of diversified versus specialized firms. With respect to expected stock 
returns, low market valuation (low Tobin’s q or high book-to-market ration) of 
diversified firms implies risk differential, mispricing, or corporate diversification being 
a significant firm characteristic affecting value and stock returns.
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) argue that three-factor model explains 
stock return variations. At the same time, a number of recent studies documents that 
some firm-specific characteristics systematically affect expected stock return (Daniel 
and Titman (1997), Titman, Wei and Xie (2001), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001)). 
These findings combined with persistent effect of the corporate diversification on 
prices, which could not be unambiguously explained by previous research, imply that 
corporate diversification may have explanatory power in addition to risk factors 
commonly used in finance literature. While we do not directly test the factor-pricing 
model against the characteristic-based model, we employ both approaches in order to 
compare stock returns of diversified firms with that of specialized firms.
Second, to address the issue of causality, we focus on diversifying event. We 
examine a smaller sample of firms that diversified their operations through mergers and 
acquisitions. We compare combined performance of the target and the bidder before the 
merger with subsequent performance of the merged entity after the merger has been 
completed. In order to test the impact of corporate diversification on the subsequent
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performance of the acquiring firm we compare unrelated (diversifying) mergers to the 
mergers in the same line of business.
This study contributes to the corporate diversification literature in several ways. 
First, we investigate the value of the corporate diversification from investors’ 
perspective and use a methodology different from that of other studies. We form 
portfolios based on whether a firm reports operations in one line of business or more 
than one line of business and test their performance over the subsequent 12 months. We 
do not rely on the matching technique of Berger and Ofek (1995), because single­
segment firms are different from segments of diversified firm in many dimensions 
(Villalonga, 2000). Instead, we try to determine the impact of corporate diversification 
on the stock return-generating process, while controlling for risk and firm’s 
characteristics.
Second, we address the puzzling finding of geographic diversification discount 
by Dennis et al (2002). Previous research in the international finance literature suggests 
that multinationality is valuable, at least in the presence of intangible assets and/or 
multinational networks (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Doukas, 1995; Morck and Yeung, 
1991,1998; Doukas and Patzalis, 1999). However, two recent studies of Bodnar, Tang 
and Weintrop (1999) and Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002) report contradictory results. 
While Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) have found that geographic diversification 
increases firm value, Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002) demonstrate that geographic 
diversification is associated with significant value-reduction. Applying different 
approach, we investigate the impact of geographic diversification on the shareholders’ 
wealth.
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Third, we examine the effect of the corporate diversification at the time of 
diversifying event. In this study, we follow real investment strategy and avoid pitfalls 
associated with benchmark construction by comparing pre-merger and post-merger 
performance. While result of this investigation is limited to acquisitions of stand-alone 
firms, it has important implications for assessment of managerial merger decisions with 
respect to shareholders’ wealth.
The investigation of a comprehensive sample of publicly traded firms over the 
last 20 years reveals that industrially diversified firms do not under-perform. While they 
are systematically different from single-segment firms, we do not find any abnormal 
performance that can be attributed to industrial diversification per se. In addition, we 
find evidence in support of the previous studies about beneficial effect of geographic 
diversification. Our results suggest that, in 1990s, industrially focused firms with 
operations abroad have significantly higher returns than that of purely domestic firms.
The investigation of firms’ performance around diversifying event reveals that 
acquisitions of stand-alone firms from unrelated lines of business have a negative effect 
on the subsequent stock performance of the acquiring firm. While firms in both 
categories of mergers (related and unrelated) exhibit negative post-merger abnormal 
returns (consistent with previous findings of Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992)), 
performance of firms that acquire targets from unrelated lines of business declines more 
rapidly. Moreover, one year after the merger completion, abnormal stock returns of 
firms that acquired targets from unrelated lines of business is 15% more negative than 
that in related mergers. Pre-merger targets’ performance and differences in firm-specific 
characteristics cannot explain this post-merger return difference. This result is not
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consistent with that of Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). Moreover, post-merger 
return changes cannot be explained by mergers’ characteristics, such as transaction size, 
method of payment or acquisition premia.
However, this result cannot be unambiguously interpreted as evidence of 
negative effect of corporate diversification. Regression analysis indicates that corporate 
diversification is not the major factor explaining poor post-merger performance. While 
statistically significant, diversification explains only 1% of the change in post-merger 
return changes in comparison to 41% explained by bidders’ pre-merger returns. This 
result is more consistent with overconfidence hypothesis (Roll (1986)). Managers of 
firms that experience superior pre-merger performance are overconfident in their 
appraisal of future merger benefits. Our results are also consistent with studies that 
document long-term post-event under-performance and returns mean reversal (Agrawal, 
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Lakonisok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)).
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents review of 
corporate diversification literature. The investigation of long-run stock returns 
performance is presented in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the impact of corporate 
diversification at the time of diversifying event. Section 5 concludes this study.
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2. TWO DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION
DISCOUNT PUZZLE
Corporate diversification has two dimensions. One dimension, that received 
much attention in the corporate finance literature, is industrial diversification. Another 
dimension is determined by whether a firm is domestic or geographically diversified. In 
this section, we discuss each of these dimensions and their implications for firms’ 
performance.
2.1. Industrial Diversification Puzzle
Theoretically, there are as many arguments for the negative impact of industrial 
diversification as for the positive one. Weston (1970) and Williamson (1975) argue that 
industrial diversification benefits shareholders because it reduces the negative impact of 
information asymmetry between managers and external capital markets. Therefore, 
managers are able to monitor firms’ operations and allocate resources more efficiently. 
In addition, diversification may lower firm’s risk, increase debt capacity, and lower 
taxes due to imperfectly correlated cash flows (Lewellen (1971)). From the 
stakeholders’ perspective, diversification may be valuable because it induces 
employees, customers and suppliers to make firm-specific investments, which leads to 
higher rents to equity-holders (Wang and Barney (2001)).
Alternatively, diversification may be the outcome of the agency problem of free 
cash flow (Jensen (1986)). Managers may want to diversify their personal portfolio at 
the expense of the shareholders (Amihud and Lev (1981)), or they become entrenched
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and diversify the firm’s operations in the directions that match their own skills the most 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Internal capital markets, that are presumably created to 
overcome the problems of information asymmetry and under-investment, can be run 
inefficiently and result in a waste of resources (Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)) and/or internal power struggle (Rajan, Sevaes, and 
Zingales (2000)).
Yet anther body of literature argues that, depending on the some firm-specific 
characteristics and/or time period, corporate diversification may be the optimal 
corporate strategy. For example, Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue that information 
efficiency of the external capital markets changes over time leading to changes in the 
value of diversification. Matsusaka (2001) develops a dynamic model in which 
diversification is a value-maximizing strategy because it maximizes firms’ 
organizational capabilities. In addition, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) develop a 
model, in which firms move into other industries in search of investment opportunities 
when returns within their original industry diminishes.
Empirical evidences to date are inconclusive. Several studies document the 
robust diversification discount. Lang and Stulz (1994) show that Tobin’s q of 
diversified firms is lower on average than that of focused firms for the 1978 -  1990 
period. Moreover, they find a negative relation between Tobin’s q and degree of 
diversification. Industry adjustment reduces the discount but does not eliminate it. 
Researchers conclude that shareholders will be better off if diversified firms were 
broken down into separate entities. However, they acknowledge that their approach 
relies on the assumption that the stand-alone q of divisions of conglomerates is well
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approximated by the average q of the specialized firms in the same industry. 
Additionally, if diversifying firms perform poorly before the act of diversification, it 
may be valuable ex ante, but loses its value due to technological and institutional 
changes. Following this line of research Servaes (1996) tested the hypothesis that 
benefits of diversification could have changed over time. However, he finds that 
diversified firms were traded at a discount even in the 1960s and to some extent in the 
1970s. Using the excess market value measure, Berger and Ofek (1995) confirm that, in 
the 1980s, diversified firms were traded at a discount relative to the industry 
benchmark. They also refine the matching technique, which become routinely used in 
most of the diversification discount studies. It should be noted however, that their 
matching technique relies on the assumption that single-segment firms are directly 
comparable to divisions of multi-segment firms.
Furthermore, Comment and Jarrell (1995) found a trend to a greater focus over 
1979-1988. Moreover, they document that firms with increased focus subsequently earn 
positive abnormal returns, while firms that have increased the degree of diversification 
earn negative abnormal returns. One of the drawbacks of their approach is that they 
calculate the abnormal returns relative to equally weighted market index. It has been 
documented that abnormal performance is often sensitive to the benchmark 
methodology. It tends to disappear when one uses value-weighted market portfolio and 
makes adjustments for common risk factors, such as size and book-to-market (Fama and 
French (1996,1998), Brav and Gompers (1997)).
Not all diversified firms are traded at a discount. Lamont and Polk (2001) 
document that, while diversified firms are discounted on average, about one third of
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them are premium firms. They found that the variation of diversification discount could 
be partially explained by differences in expected returns. Discount firms have higher 
expected returns while premium firms have lower expected returns. However, they find 
that on average diversified firms have the same returns as the portfolio of comparable 
single-segment firms. This finding is puzzling. If average diversified firm trades at a 
discount and the excess value varies with returns, one should expect that returns on the 
portfolio of diversified firms would differ from returns on the portfolio of single­
segment firms.
In an optimal firms’ behavior framework, Campa and Kedia (2002) find that 
diversification discount turns into a premium when other firm’s characteristics are 
accounted for. They document that diversified firms trade at a discount during nine to 
twenty years around the diversification decision. Therefore, it is hard to assert 
unambiguously that it is the diversification per se that gets discounted.
Contrary to the diversification discount literature, Schoar (2002) finds that 
plants of diversified firms are more productive in comparison to focused firms. Using 
different methodology Villalonga (2000) finds that diversification discount is sensitive 
to the matching technique. With different methodology, the discount disappears and 
even turns into a premium. She concludes that the discount is not a diversification 
effect. Since diversified firms are different in many dimensions, constructing an 
adequate benchmark may be problematic and can lead to spurious results.
While studies based on profitability and excess market value have been 
inconclusive, researchers that employ the event-study methodology also document 
conflicting results. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) document negative market
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reaction to unrelated acquisitions. However, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) found 
positive total returns to diversifying acquisitions, implying an overall positive effect. 
Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Chevalier (2000) find positive market 
reaction to announcements of diversifying acquisitions. These latter findings are hard 
to reconcile with studies that report diversification discount and higher returns to 
specialization. Furthermore, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) find that units added to 
conglomerates are traded at a discount before they are acquired, but buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of diversifying firms are positive.
2.2. Multinationality and Diversification Discount
When a firm extends its operations abroad it may increase the firm value due to 
internalization of intangible assets (Caves (1971) and/or multinational networks (Kogut 
and Zander (1983), Kogut (1985)). It may be also value destroying, as geographically 
diversified firms become difficult to monitor (Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1999)). 
Previous empirical research tends to support the value-increasing impact of geographic 
diversification (Erunza and Senbet (1981, 19984), Doukas and Travlos (1988), Doukas 
(1995), Morck and Yeung, (1991,1998), Doukas and Pantzalis (1999)). However, 
recently Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002) 
obtained contradictory results. While Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) have found 
that geographic diversification increases the firm value, Dennis, Dennis and Yost 
(2002) demonstrate that geographic diversification is associated with significant value 
reduction.
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Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) suggest that a large part of the 
diversification discount uncovered by previous studies arise primarily from the failure 
to account for geographic diversification. They examine the combined effect of 
industrial and geographic diversification and documented that a failure to control for 
geographic diversification leads to biased estimates of the effect of industrial 
diversification. In addition, after controlling for industrial diversification, they confirm 
previous findings of positive value effect of geographic diversification. However, when 
Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002) added other firms’ characteristics to the analysis they 
found negative value effect of global diversification.
Thus, the corporate diversification discount puzzle has two dimensions. One is 
the industrial diversification discount and the other is the geographic diversification 
discount. Therefore, in our investigation of the stock performance we account for both 
industrial and geographic diversification.
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3. CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND LONG-TERM STOCK RETURNS
3.1. Introduction
In this section, we compare average realized stock returns of diversified firms to 
those of specialized firms. If corporate diversification destroys value then, after 
adjustment for risk characteristics, a portfolio of single-segment firms should 
consistently outperform a portfolio of multi-segment firms in the long run. Fama and 
French (1992, 1993) show that cross-sectional relation between stock returns and 
expected earnings can be captured by three risk factors, that is excess market returns, 
size, and book-to-market ratio. Carhart (1997) adds another factor that captures the 
effect of one-year momentum on stock returns. Therefore, in order to adjust for risk 
sensitivity we use the four-factor linear model that includes three factors developed by 
Fama and French (1992,1993) and fourth factor proposed by Carhart (1997).
However, Fama-French procedure requires a formation of portfolios and 
suppresses the possible effect of firms-specific characteristics on stock returns. In order 
to test whether corporate diversification has an effect on stock returns in addition to 
other common firms’ characteristics, we apply the characteristic-based model (Daniel 
and Titman (1997), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)). We employ Fama- 
MacBeth (1973) methodology and use recent work of Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) as a guide to define relevant firm characteristics, in addition to 
those identified by the previous research of corporate diversification.
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3.2.Data
3.2. A. Sample Selection and Portfolio Formation Procedure
At the end of June of each year (1981-2000) all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms 
are allocated into two portfolios according to the number of reported segments by SIC 
code: portfolio of single-segment firms or portfolio of multi-segment firms. In the past, 
researchers used the number of segments operating in industries with different 4-digit 
SIC codes to classify firms as diversified or focused (Lang and Stulz (1994), Lamont 
and Polk (2001), Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999), Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002)). 
However, the classification by 4-digit SIC code may be misleading in that we would 
classify firms as diversified when, in fact, they operate in closely related industries. On 
the other hand, using 3 digit (or lower) SIC code may result in the misclassification of 
the opposite nature (Villalonga (2000)). Therefore, we perform all our tests using 4, 3, 
2, and 1-digit SIC codes.
Another common measure of industrial diversification is the sales or assets 
based Herfindahl index. We do not use Herfindahl index because it measures the degree 
of diversification. For our purposes we need only to classify firms as focused or 
diversified. Since firms, which we classify as single-segment, have sales generated by 
only one segment, the Herfindahl index for these firms always equals one. All other 
firms are classified as multi-segment firms regardless of their degree of diversification. 
Therefore, classification based on Herfindahl index will lead to the same results and is 
redundant.
The data on number of segments are collected from COMPUSTAT research and 
active files at the fiscal year ending year t = -1 relative to portfolio formation year t = 0.
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Segment is defined by reported operations and sales in the same SIC code. If a firm 
reports operations and sales in several segments with the same SIC code, these 
segments are treated as one. Firms that report sales generated by only one segment are 
classified as single-segment firms. Firms with two or more segments are classified as 
multi-segment firms. Firms with segments in 1-digit SIC code of 0 ,6  or 9 are excluded.
Previously, researchers have excluded from the analysis those firms that report 
less than $20 millions in consolidated sales (Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), Dennis, 
Dennis and Yost (2002)), less than $30 millions in sales (Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop 
(1999)), or less than $100 millions in assets (Lang and Stulz (1994)). The purpose of 
this requirement is to mitigate the problem of comparing very small segments with 
much larger focused firms (Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002)). However, since in our 
study we do not employ the matching technique and use returns as the performance 
measure, our only concern is the possible distortions from firms in the early 
development stage, such as biotech, internet, etc. Therefore, we exclude firms with less 
than $10 millions in sales as in Titman, Wei and Xie (2001).
In addition to being classified as single-segment or multi-segment, all firms in 
our sample are independently sorted into portfolios according to reported foreign sales 
as a fraction of total sales. This COMPUSTAT item sums Net Geographic Sales for the 
set of all geographic segments with a Geographic Segment Area Code of 98 (all foreign 
segments), and divides it by Net Sales. Firms that report percent of foreign sales greater 
than 10% of the firm’s total sales are classified as geographically diversified. Firms that 
report no foreign sales or less than 10% of foreign sales of the firm’s total sales are 
classified as domestic. Our requirement of at least 10% of total sales generated by
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foreign operations is conservative. The reason is that under the disclosure requirements 
of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard #14 (Financial Accounting Standard 
Board 1976) firms must report sales, income or assets for foreign operations if they 
account for at least 10% of the firm’s total sales, income or assets. Some firms report 
these figures even if foreign sales are less than 10 % of the total sales. However, we 
cannot identify firms that do not report sales, income, and assets from foreign 
operations, which are less than 10% of the firm’s total. Therefore, we use 10% foreign 
sales as a cut off point for our classification.
3.2.B. Diversification Trend
Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of single-segment and multi­
segment firms in each of the portfolio-formation year from 1981 to 2000. We discuss 
our results for the 4-digit SIC code classification with the results for 2-digit SIC code 
classification reported in brackets for comparison.
In our sample, the average number of firms per year is 3076, of which 913 [752] 
are the multi-segment firms (roughly 30% [24%] of the total number of firms) and 2162 
[2323] are single-segment firms. However, from year to year, the number of multi­
segment firms as a percent of the total number of firms has declined dramatically. In 
1981, with the number of multi-segment firms was 52% [44%] of the total sample; by 
1998 this number declined to 17% [13%]. In the past, researchers attributed this decline 
to the disciplinary effect of the market for the corporate control (Comment and Jarrell 
(1995), Berger and Ofek (1996), Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002)). However, in 1999, 
we observe the increase in number of multi-segment firms to 26% [20%]. Actually, the
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increase in industrial diversification began even earlier since the 1999 portfolio consists 
of firms that report the number of segments in 1998 fiscal year.
< Insert Table 1 about here >
Table 2 presents the distribution of firms in our sample in portfolios formed by 
intersection of industrial and geographic classifications in each portfolio formation year 
from 1981 to 2000. For domestic and geographically diversified firms alike, the percent 
of multi-segment firms has declined over the 1981-1998 period and started to increase 
in 1999. It suggests that geographic diversification is not a substitute for industrial 
diversification. While the level of industrial diversification is higher for geographically 
diversified firms, the trends in both groups are similar. This finding suggests that 
neither domestic nor geographically diversified firms’ samples drive our previous 
results of diversification trend reversal.
< Insert Table 2 about here >
Our finding of the trend reversal has interesting implications. If corporate 
diversification destroys value and markets are efficient (although adjusting slowly) we 
should observe a continuation of the trend toward a greater focus. Why then market 
forces not just fail to eliminate presumably inefficient value-destroying diversified firms 
but actually encourage a grater diversification in the late 1990s? Alternatively, if 
markets are efficient then increase in corporate diversification indicates that corporate
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diversification per se may not be harmful to the shareholders’ value, at least in the late 
1990s.
3.2.C. Portfolios Characteristics
Table 3 presents the summary statistics. Panel A shows the average number of 
firms, size, and book-to-market ratio; Panel B presents debt to total assets, capital 
expenditures to sales, EBIT to sales ratios, and dividend yield. We report summary 
statistics for portfolios that account for industrial diversification and geographic 
diversification separately and jointly for the whole 1981-2000 portfolio formation 
period and for two sub-periods: 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 that represent 1980s and 
1990s, respectively.
Size and book-to-market ratio are calculated using the Fama-French (1992, 
1993) methodology. Size is the market capitalization of the firm at the end of June of 
portfolio formation year t obtained from CRSP. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as 
follows: BE/ME, where BE is the COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders’ equity 
(item A216), plus deferred taxes (item A 126) and investment tax credit (item A208) (if 
available), minus the book value of preferred stock. The book value of preferred stock is 
estimated, depending on the availability, using redemption (item A56), liquidating (item 
A10), or par value (item A130) (in that order). BE is calculated for the fiscal year 
ending in calendar year t-1. Firms with negative BE are excluded from the sample. ME 
is the market capitalization of the firm at the end of December of calendar year t-1. Size 
and book-to-market breakpoints for each year are those of Fama and French (1992, 
1993) and are obtained from K. French’s web page. For each classification portfolio we
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report the average number of firms, firms’ size, and book-to-market ratio, averaged 
across firms for each year and then averaged over the years in each time period.
The majority of firms in our sample fall in the single-segment/domestic 
category. The average number of multi-segment/geographically diversified firms per 
year is only 287 [233] out of 3076 or 9.3% [7.6%]. Although geographically diversified 
firms account for 25% of the sample on average, the majority of these firms are single­
segment firms. Over time, the average number of geographically diversified firms has 
increased from 630 (23.9%) in the 1980s to 918 (26.1%) in the 1990s. However, due to 
the declining trend of industrial diversification, the average number of multi­
segment/geographically diversified firms fell from 304 [253] (11.5% [9.6%]) to 269 
[214] (7.7% [6.1%]) over the same period.
Largest firms in our sample are geographically diversified firms, with multi­
segment geographically diversified firms having market capitalization over $4 billion 
on average in the 1990s. Even single-segment geographically diversified firms are two 
times larger than domestic multi-segment firms are. Thus, both industrial and 
geographic diversification contributes to firms’ size increase. This observation has 
important implications for our further analysis of the stock returns since it has been long 
documented in the literature that smaller firm size can lead to higher returns (Fama and 
French (1992,1993,1996)).
< Insert Table 3 about here >
Consistent with previous findings that diversified firms have lower q-ratio (Lang 
and Stulz (1994)), multi-segment firms have higher book-to-market ratio. Additionally,
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domestic firms tend to have higher book-to-market ratios. Since high book-to-market 
stocks usually have higher returns, we expect to observe this pattern when portfolios 
stock returns are examined.
Debt to total asset ratio is obtained from COMPUSTAT and is defined as the 
sum of long-term debt (item A9) and debt in current liabilities (item A34), divided by 
total assets (item A6), which represent the sum of current assets, net plant, and other 
non-current assets. Over the total period and in each sub-period, the debt to assets ratio 
of multi-segment firms is higher than that of single-segment firms, consistent with 
Lewellin (1971) argument that diversified firms have higher debt capacity in 
comparison to focused firms. The pattern is the same for both domestic and 
geographically diversified firms’ samples. However, domestic firms have higher debt 
ratios in comparison to geographically diversified firms. Overall, single­
segment/geographically diversified firms have the lowest debt to assets ratio, while 
multi-segment/domestic firms have the highest.
It is frequently argued that small single-segment firms have difficulty raising 
external capital and suffer from under-investment and sub-optimal growth (Myers and 
Majluff (1984)). However, large diversified firms may over-invest because cash earned 
by well-performing segment can be used to subsidize poorly performing divisions or to 
expand business beyond the optimal size (Jensen (1986), Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz 
(1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). Therefore, we should expect to find higher 
degree of capital expenditures by diversified firms in comparison to the focused firms. 
However, we observe just the opposite. Single-segment firms consistently invest more. 
This finding is not consistent with over-investment argument.
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Moreover, Titman, Wei and Xie (2001) document that firms with higher capital 
expenditures under-perform, on the risk-adjusted basis, in comparison to those with low 
capital expenditures. The fact that diversified firms do not invest more in comparison to 
focused firms cast a serious doubt on the argument that corporate diversification usually 
associates with or leads to over-investment.
EBIT to sales ratio measures profitability of the firm. We do not find a 
significant difference in profitability across firms and over time. One exception is low 
profitability of the single-segment/domestic firms in the 1990s. However, these are the 
smallest firms, which also have the highest capital expenditures. Therefore, although we 
excluded very small firms (less than $10 million in sales) our sample may still contain a 
large number of new firms in the early stages of their development and rapid growth. 
This also may explain why single-segment firms in our sample pay lower dividends in 
comparison to multi-segment firms.
The investigation of portfolios’ characteristics reveals that diversified firms 
differ from specialized firms in many dimensions. This finding is important for two 
reasons. First, it indicates that diversified and specialized firms are not comparable 
without an adjustment for these differences because it has been previously documented 
that some firm-specific characteristics systematically affect stock returns (Daniel and 
Titman (1997), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Second, previous 
research suggests that firm characteristic such as degree of industrial and/or geographic 
diversification may have explanatory power in addition to risk factors commonly used 
in the finance literature. For example, Titman, Wei and Xie (2001) find that higher 
capital investment activity of a firm is associated with negative abnormal returns.
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Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) uncovered strong negative relation between 
corporate governance provisions related to takeover defense, abnormal stock returns, 
and firm value.
3.3. Portfolios’ Returns
If corporate diversification destroys value (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and 
Ofek (1995, 1996), Servaes (1996), Dennis, Dennis, and Yost (2002)) and there is a 
premium for specialization (Comment and Jarrel (1995)), investment in a portfolio of 
single-segment firms should earn higher returns in comparison to the investment in a 
portfolio of multi-segment firms. To investigate this hypothesis we calculate various 
measures of returns on the corresponding portfolios (Table 4). We report average 
monthly raw returns, average monthly abnormal returns, buy and hold abnormal returns, 
and cumulative abnormal returns. Average monthly raw returns are returns on the 
value-weighted corresponding portfolio. Average monthly abnormal returns are the 
portfolio raw returns less the value-weighted market portfolio returns. The abnormal 
buy and hold returns are the monthly returns compounded over the one-year holding 
period less the buy and hold returns on the market. Cumulative abnormal returns are the 
sum of monthly returns over the one-year period less the cumulative market returns 
over the same period. Market portfolio consists of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms in 
CRSP database.
We use non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for groups of two series and 
Kruskal-Wallis test for groups of four series to test the significance of the difference 
among median returns on portfolios. Although, consistent with Bodnar, Tang and
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Weintrop (1999) and the previous literature on the value of multinationality, 
geographically diversified firms in the 1980s in multi-segment category and 
geographically diversified firms in the 1990s in single-segment category seem to have 
somewhat higher returns, we do not observe any statistically significant difference 
among all measures of portfolio returns. This observation is not consistent with 
diversification discount literature because if diversification destroys value we should 
observe differences in stock performance.
One explanation for this lack of stock return differential is that firms’ 
characteristics such as size and book-to-market have an impact on the stock returns in 
the opposite directions, thus offsetting each other. For example, single-segment firms 
are smaller, which leads to higher returns. However, they also and have lower book-to- 
market ratios (high prices in comparison to book value of stocks), meaning that they 
should have lower returns. These two trends work in opposite directions. Therefore, we 
may not observe any dramatic differences in the returns of single-segment and multi­
segment firms.
< Insert Table 4 about here >
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3.4. Four-Factor Model
3.4. A. Methodology and Hypotheses
If corporate diversification affects firms’ performance, this relation should be 
incorporated in the stock prices. To the extent that investors anticipate performance 
changes associated with diversification the price adjustment is quick, and subsequent 
realized returns should not be systematically different from expected returns on a 
passive portfolio with similar risk factors sensitivities. To account for common risk 
factors, we employ Carhart (1997) four-factor model that extends the Fama-French 
(1992,1993) three-factor model by adding a momentum factor.
We estimate the following regressions:
R; -  Rf = ai + b̂ Rm -  Rf) +Si SMB + hi HML+mi MOMENTUM+ Ci (1) 
where (R; -  R f) are monthly excess returns on the value-weighted portfolio of firms in 
the portfolio in question, Rf is the monthly Treasury bill rate, (Rm - R f ) are value- 
weighted excess market returns on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms. SMB (small 
minus big) is the difference between the monthly returns on small firms and big firms. 
HML (high minus low) is the difference between monthly returns on a portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
MOMENTUM is the a momentum factor, constructed from six value-weight portfolios 
formed using independent sorts on size and prior return of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks. It is the average of the returns on two (big and small) high prior 
return portfolios minus the average of the returns on two low prior return portfolios. 
Prior return is measured from month -12 to -2. All factors’ definitions and returns, 
including momentum factor, can be obtained from Kenneth French’s web page.
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Low valuation of diversified firms in comparison to focused firms implies that 
investors anticipate poor performance of diversified firms. Factor-pricing model 
predicts that low-value firms should earn high ex post returns due to positive loading on 
the value factor (HML), after controlling for market risk, size, and momentum. 
Moreover, the returns on zero-investment portfolio, which takes a long position in 
specialized firms’ stocks and a short position in diversified firms’ stocks, should have 
significantly negative loading on the value factor (HML).
Systematic size differences between diversified and specialized firms should be 
captured by size factor (SML). Diversified firms are usually larger than specialized 
firms are. Fama and French (1992, 1993) document that small firms earn higher returns 
due to the positive loading on size factor (SML). To the extent than specialized firms 
are smaller than diversified firms we expect that returns on zero-investment portfolio 
should have significantly positive loading on SML.
However, the portion of stock returns difference between diversified and 
specialized firms that is not related to risk differential should be captured by 
regressions’ intercepts (similar to Jensen’s alpha). If market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors capture common risk differences, the intercept can be interpreted as 
abnormal returns arising from the differences in degree of diversification. If diversified 
firms systematically under-perform specialized firms on the risk-adjusted basis we 
should observe significantly positive intercept in zero-investment portfolio regressions.
Moreover, if diversification is a significant factor that determines stock returns 
we should find significantly positive intercept in regressions run only on specialized 
firms and significantly negative intercept in regressions mn only on diversified firms. In
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order to investigate this hypothesis further and to test the hypothesis of all intercepts 
being jointly zero we calculate Wald %2-statistic and Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) 
F(GRS)-statistic.
To calculate F(GRS), we follow Fama and French (1993) procedure. First, all 
firms in our sample are independently sorted into portfolios according to the industrial 
and geographic diversification. Next, firms are independently allocated into portfolios 
according to their size (market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year) and 
book-to-market ratios (at the end of the previous fiscal year). Firms with the market 
capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year in the lowest two quintiles are 
classified as “Small”, in the upper two quintiles are classified as “Large”, the middle 20 
percent are the “Medium”. Book-to-market classification is done in the same manner. 
We aggregate two lowest and two highest quintiles due to the limitations of our sample. 
The intersection of these classifications (industrial and geographic diversification, size 
and book-to-market) result in 36 portfolios - nine portfolios per each diversification 
classification.
F(GRS) is calculated for each diversification category as follows:
F(GRS) = (A’ 2  -1 A)(N -  K -  L + 1)/(L * (N -  K)*w) (2) 
where N is the number of time series observations, L is the number of regressions K is 1 
plus the number of explanatory variables in the regression, A is the column vector of 
regression intercepts, 2  (L x L) is the covariance matrix of the residuals from 
regressions, and w is the diagonal element of (X’X)'1 corresponding to the intercept. 
F(GRS) has an F-distribution with L and (N -  K -  L +1) degrees of freedom (Gibbons, 
Ross, and Shanken (1989)).
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If corporate diversification has a significant impact on stock returns in addition 
to required returns, Wald %2-statistic and F(GRS)-statistics should be significantly 
different from zero.
3.4.B. Results
Table 5 reports regression results for industrial diversification only. Results are 
reported for two industrial classifications - by 4-digit SIC and by 2-digit SIC codes (in 
brackets).
Considered separately, single-segment firms earn statistically significant 
monthly abnormal returns. When examined in each sub-period, the positive abnormal 
performance of specialized firms stems entirely from their superior performance in the 
1990s. In this period, the abnormal average monthly returns of the portfolio of 
specialized firms are 0.22% [0.21%], statistically significant at 5% level. The only 
indication of abnormal performance of multi-segment firms is statistically significant 
positive intercept in the 1980s. However, this result is weak. It is statistically significant 
only at 10% level and the result holds only for 4-digit SIC classification.
When we compare performance on multi-segment firms to that of specialized 
firms, first thing to note is that intercept of the zero-investment portfolio in not 
statistically significant. This result holds for the whole period and for the two sub­
periods. Thus, the regression results do not support the hypothesis that industrially 
diversified firms under-perform focused firms.
When we examine the loadings on factors, it is apparent that in the 1980s, there 
are no differences in terms of risk between single-segment and multi-segment firms, as
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indicated by insignificant coefficients on all factors in the zero-investment portfolio. All 
factor-lading differences occur in the 1990s, indicated by statistically significant 
coefficients of SMB, HML, and MOMENTUM variables of zero-investment portfolio 
regression.
As pointed out earlier, single-segment firms are smaller than multi-segment 
firms are. Therefore, single-segment firms load positively on the size factor while multi­
segment firms load negatively. With respect to loading on the value factor (HML), the 
results are surprising. Consistent with lower book-to-market ratio returns of single­
segment firms load significantly negatively on HML. However, returns of multi­
segment firms do not load positively on HML although they have higher book-to- 
market ratio. Thus, there is no indication that the value factor plays any significant role 
in determining the returns for the multi-segment firms.
Results in Table 5 suggest that, while there is evidence of the premium to 
specialization in the 1990s, we cannot assert that in the last 20 years industrial 
diversification was harmful to investors. This result is not consistent with the prior 
literature on the value-destroying impact of industrial diversification (Lang and Stulz
(1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), and Servaes
(1996)).
< Insert Table 5 about here >
Table 6 reports regression results for portfolio of domestic firms versus portfolio 
of geographically diversified firms. Geographically diversified firms earn abnormal 
returns for the whole period of 1981-2001 and for each sub-period. Moreover, the
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magnitude and significance of the abnormal returns have increased over time. In the 
1990s, the intercept is two times of that in the 1980s. At the same time, the intercept for 
the portfolio of domestic firms is not statistically different from zero. Thus, this result is 
a strong evidence of positive impact of geographic diversification consistent with the 
prior literature on the value of multi-nationality (Doukas and Travlos (1988), Doukas 
(1995), Morck and Yeung (1991,1998), Doukas and Pantzalis (1999), Bodnar, Tang and 
Weintrop (1999)).
< Insert Table 6 about here >
Prior research (Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999), Dennis, Denis and Yost 
(2002)) indicates that industrial and geographic diversification have to be considered 
jointly. Results of regression analysis, that takes into account both industrial and 
geographic diversification, are reported in Table 7.
When the sample of domestic firms is divided into single-segment and multi­
segment firms, neither displays abnormal performance (statistically insignificant 
intercept). However, there are differences in factor loadings. Single-segment domestic 
firms load positively on SMB and negatively on HML factors. This relation is in the 
predicted direction because single-segment firms are small, low book-to-market firms 
(Table 3, Panel A). However, the result holds only for the 1990s. In the 1980s, there are 
no significant loadings on size and value factors. Moreover, while multi-segment 
domestic firms load negatively on SMB and positively on HML, the relation is weak 
and does not hold for sub-periods. Thus, in the domestic firms’ sample, there is no 
indication that industrial diversification has significant impact on stock returns.
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When we account for industrial diversification in the sample of geographically 
diversified firms, the trend is different in the 1980s in comparison to the 1990s. In the 
1980s, multi-segment/geographically diversified firms earn monthly abnormal returns 
of 22 [22] basis points. Single-segment firms did not earn more than required returns. 
However, in the 1990s, we observe the opposite trend. Single-segment firms outperform 
passive strategy by 54 [45] basis points per month. This result suggests that, while 
geographic diversification plays a significant role in the stock return generating process, 
its impact has changed over time. One of the reasons may be that value of specialization 
in geographic diversification (Morck and Yeung (1991,1998); Doukas and Pantzalis 
(1999)) increased over time. It is also confirmed by changes in diversification trend. In 
the 1980s, the number of single-segment geographically diversified firms is about the 
same as the number of multi-segment geographically diversified firms. In the 1990s, the 
number of single-segment firms that diversify geographically almost doubled, while the 
number of multi-segment geographically diversified firms declined.
Next, we investigate the effect of geographic diversification on stock returns 
within single-segment and multi-segment categories for two sub-periods. The impact of 
geographic diversification on single-segment and multi-segment firms has changed over 
time. In the 1980s, there is no difference in abnormal return within single-segment 
category. Multi-segment geographically diversified firms earned significantly positive 
abnormal returns, while single-segment domestic firms did not. The difference is 29 
basis points and is statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, in that period, 
industrial diversification coupled with geographic diversification was beneficial. 
However, in the 1990s, the beneficial impact of geographic diversification on the multi­
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
31
segment firms disappears. At the same time, single-segment geographically diversified 
firms earned 59 basis points higher abnormal in comparison to single-segment domestic 
firms.
< Insert Table 7 about here >
Thus, results indicate that geographic diversification has strong and independent 
influence on stock returns, consistent with Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999). 
However, change of the impact of geographic diversification over time depends on 
industrial diversification. This result suggests that when examining the impact of 
corporate diversification strategy one should account for industrial and geographic 
diversification independently and jointly.
Table 8 reports the result of F(GRS) tests for each diversification category. The 
abnormal performance of multi-segment/geographically diversified firms in the 1980s is 
driven primarily by large, low book-to-market firms. At the same time, low book-to- 
market multi-segment/domestic firms actually earn negative abnormal returns in that 
period along with almost all other categories. In the 1990s, F(GRS) is not significant for 
multi-segment firms, whether domestic or geographically diversified. However, in the 
1990s, almost all categories of single-segment/geographically diversified firms (with 
only one exception) earn positive and significant abnormal returns, with F(GRS) 
statistic being highly statistically significant.
< Insert Table 8 about here >
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This result indicates that geographic diversification has a significant effect on 
stock returns. Moreover, its impact changes over time depending on firms’ industrial 
diversification. Additionally, finding significant abnormal risk-adjusted returns for 
different diversification categories (indicated by statistically significant intercept and 
confirmed by significant F(GRS) test) warrants further investigation of the impact of 
industrial and geographic diversification on stock return generating process.
3.5.Characteristic-Based Model
3.5.A. Methodology and Hypotheses
The results of the previous section indicate that geographic diversification is a 
significant determinant of stock returns, while the impact of industrial diversification is 
not certain. Therefore, we turn to the characteristic-based model (Daniel and Titman
(1997), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)). The advantage of this model is 
that firm-specific characteristics are not lost within portfolios. If the return-generating 
process is based on firms’ characteristics rather than on common risk factors, this model 
should help to investigate whether corporate diversification is a relevant characteristic.
For each month in the sample period, from July 1981 to June 2001, the 
following regression is estimated:
Ri = a; + bi X; +C; Di + Ci ( (3)
where, R; are the monthly raw returns of each stock.
Xj is the vector of firms’ characteristics that includes the following variables:
BM -log of book-to-market ratio in the previous fiscal year 
SIZE -  log of market capitalization at the end of month t (-2)
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PRICE -  log of price reciprocal at the end of month t (-2)
DVOL -  the dollar volume of trading in the month t (-2). It is approximated by stock 
price at the end of month t (-2) multiplied by share volume in month t(-2).
DIVYLD -  the ratio of dividends in the previous fiscal year to market capitalization at 
the calendar year end (not in logs).
RET6 -  Compounded gross returns for months t (-6) through t (-2)
RET12 -  Compounded gross returns for months t (-12) and t (-2)
CAPX/SALES -  is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales in the previous fiscal year 
EBIT/SALES - is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales in the previous 
fiscal year
DAT -  the debt ratio in the previous fiscal year
Di is the vector of variables that captures industrial and geographic diversification: 
INDDUM -  industrial diversification dummy.
GEODUM -  geographic diversification dummy.
Lagged variables exclude the immediate prior month data to avoid any spurious 
association between prior month and the current month (Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998)), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001)).
We follow the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure and estimate (3) separately 
for each month. Next, we calculate the time series mean of the coefficient estimates for 
the entire period from July 1981 to June 2001 (240 months), and for two sub-periods 
corresponding to the 1980s and 1990s (120 months respectively). Finally, we perform a 
t-test for the hull hypothesis that the mean is zero.
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If corporate diversification has an impact on the stock returns the coefficients of 
diversification variables should be statistically significant. Moreover, if industrial 
diversification destroys value variable INDDUM should have negative coefficient. If, as 
indicated by our previous results, geographic diversification has a positive impact on 
the stock returns, the coefficient of variable GEODUM should be positive. The 
interactive term GEODUM*INDDUM should account for possible joint effect of 
industrial and geographic diversification.
To investigate the difference in the impact of geographic diversification on 
single-segment and multi-segment firms, we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions 
separately for single-segment and multi-segment firms and then find the coefficient 
difference. If geographic diversification affects single- segment and multi-segment 
firms differently, we should observe statistically significant coefficient for the variable 
GOEDUM. Moreover, this coefficient should be positive if geographic diversification 
benefits single-segment firms but not multi-segment firms, and negative otherwise.
3.5.B. Results
Regression results are reported in Table 9. Fama-MacBeth procedure confirms 
our results of positive effect of geographic diversification on stock returns. Panel A 
shows results for the entire period (240 months). Regression 1 includes only industrial 
and diversification dummy variables but does not account for interaction between them. 
Coefficient of geographic dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level. When accounted for interaction between industrial and geographic diversification 
(Regression2), coefficient of geographic dummy variable is no longer significant,
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however still positive. Regressions 2 and 3 show results for single-segment and multi­
segment firms separately. Geographic diversification dummy is positive for both single­
segment and multi-segment firms. However, it is marginally statistically significant 
(10% level) only for multi-segment firms. The difference between geographic dummy 
coefficients is not statistically significant.
Previously, we have documented that the impact of corporate diversification is 
different for 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, Panels B and C report regression results for 
these periods respectively. In the 1980s, geographic diversification variable coefficient 
is not significant, whether with or without interactive variable included (Regressions 2 
and 1 respectively). However, consistent with previous research literature (e.g., 
Comment and Jarrell (1995)), industrial diversification has statistically significant 
negative effect on stock returns. Moreover, the size of the industrial dummy variable 
coefficient and its statistical significance increases in the presence of interactive term. 
This implies that while industrial diversification has negative effect, it can be mitigated 
by geographic diversification (Regression 2).
When single-segment and multi-segment firms are considered separately, 
geographic diversification variable coefficients have opposite signs. In the sub-sample 
of singe-segment firms, geographic diversification coefficient is negative (Regression 
3), while in the sub-sample of multi-segment firms it is positive (Regression 4). Neither 
is statistically significant. However, the difference between coefficients is statistically 
significant at 10% level (Regression 5). This finding suggests that, in the 1980s, 
geographic diversification had different impact on single-segment and multi-segment 
firms, confirming our previous results of four-factor model analysis.
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Positive impact of geographic diversification becomes more pronounced in the 
1990s (Panel C). Geographic diversification has significantly positive effect, but not 
industrial diversification. The coefficient of geographic diversification variable is 
positive and statistically significant without and with the interactive term (Regressions 1 
and 2). In regressions separate for single-segment and multi-segment firms (Regressions 
3 and 4), only single-segment firms experience statistically significant positive effect of 
geographic diversification. In multi-segment firms subsumable, geographic 
diversification variable coefficient is not significant though positive. However, the 
difference between coefficients is not statistically significant (Regression 5).
< Insert Table 9 about here >
Overall, our results suggest that geographic diversification is a profitable 
corporate business strategy and its importance has increased over time. However, the 
role of industrial diversification in stock return generating process remains elusive.
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3.6.Constant-Composition Sample
Our overall sample contains considerable number of firms that are new to the 
market. Therefore, in order to mitigate the impact of new firms on the results we limit 
the sample to the firms that were present in the sample in 1981. To avoid look-ahead 
bias, we do not eliminate firms that did not survive until the end of study period. In 
other words, firms are allowed to exit the sample but not to enter.
The results of Fama and MacBeth regressions are reported in Table 10. In the 
1980s (Panel B), we observe a definite negative impact of the industrial diversification 
as indicated by the highly statistically significant negative coefficient of the variable 
IND (Regressions 1 and 2). However, the combined effect of both industrial and 
geographic diversification is positive (Regression 2). Moreover, while we find that 
coefficients of GEODUM for single-segment and multi-segment firms separately are 
not statistically significant (Regressions 3 and 4) the return difference is significant 
(Regression 5). The difference is 27 basis points and is significant at 10% level. This 
result confirms our previous conclusion that, in the 1980s, industrial diversification 
combined with geographic diversification was beneficial to the shareholders.
In the 1990s (Panel C), both single-segment and multi-segment firms earn 
higher returns due to geographic diversification (Regressions 1 and 2). At the same, 
time the industrial diversification ceased being an important determinant of the stock 
returns. The combined impact of the industrial and geographic diversification becomes 
negative. However, it is not statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients of GEO 
for single-segment and multi-segment firms separately are both positive and not 
statistically significant (Regressions 3 and 4); the return difference is not significant
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either (Regression 5). Thus, this result indicates that new firms in our sample determine 
our previous finding of superior performance of single-segment geographically 
diversified firms. Moreover, since the number of firms in the sample declined over time 
it is possible, that multi-segment firms for which geographic diversification was 
negative had exited the market.
< Insert Table 10 about here >
3.7.Results Summary
A number of recent studies documents that some firm-specific characteristics 
rather than common risk factors systematically affect expected stock returns (Daniel 
and Titman (1997), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2001)). These findings suggest that firm characteristic such as degree of 
industrial and/or geographic diversification may have explanatory power in addition to 
risk factors commonly used in the finance literature. In this study, we applied several 
different approaches in order to examine stock returns of diversified versus specialized 
firms in an attempt to isolate effect of diversification on stock returns from the effect of 
other common firms’ characteristics and risk.
The investigation of the comprehensive sample of publicly traded firms over the 
last 20 years yields several interesting results. First, after decline in the diversification, 
since 1980s and through the mid-1990s, there is an increase in both industrial and 
geographic diversification in at the end of 1990s. This trend reversal is not consistent 
with efficient markets and negative effect of corporate diversification.
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Second, there are considerable differences in firm’s characteristics depending on 
the industrial or geographic diversification. These characteristics include those affecting 
stock returns, e.g. size and book-to-market ratio (Fama and French (1992, 1993)) and 
capital expenditures (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2001)). It implies that diversified firms are 
not just a collection of single-segment units. They are fundamentally different and are 
not directly comparable to the portfolio of matching single-segment firms. Therefore, 
previous findings of diversification discount that employ imputed value technique 
(Berger and Ofek (1995)) may be driven by risk differences between diversified and 
specialized firms.
Third, returns of portfolios of diversified and focused firms do not differ. This 
result is surprising if corporate diversification is value destroying. However, finding of 
significantly different loadings on the risk factors confirms that single-segment and 
diversified firms are fundamentally different and no meaningful comparison can be 
made unless one accounts for these differences. Single-segment firms are smaller and 
their stock returns load positively on the size factor (SMB). At the same time, they have 
lower book-to-market ratio leading to positive loading on the value factor (HML). 
Diversified firms’ stock returns have the opposite trend. They are large have higher 
book-to-market ratios. Therefore, negative loading on SMB offsets their positive 
loading on HML.
Fourth, the abnormal returns on the zero-investment portfolio, which takes a 
long position in the specialized firms and short position in diversified firms, are not 
significantly different from zero except for geographically diversified firms. Our results 
suggest that, in 1990s, industrially focused firms with operations abroad were rewarded
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
40
more than purely domestic firms. This result is robust to the model specification and 
does not change whether the four-factor model or the characteristic-based model is 
used. This result runs contrary to the finding of Dennis, Dennis, and Yost (2002) that 
geographic diversification destroys value. However, it confirms previous findings that 
multinationality is a valuable asset (Doukas and Travlos (1988), Doukas (1995), Morck 
and Yeung (1991,1998), Doukas and Pantzalis (1999), Bodnar et al (1999)).
Fifth, the effect of industrial diversification on stock returns remains 
inconclusive. While four-factor model does not show any significant effect of industrial 
diversification on stock returns, this result is not robust. In the characteristic based 
model framework, industrial diversification has a significant negative influence stock 
returns in the 1980s. Moreover, the effect of geographic diversification in the 1990s 
seems to depend on industrial diversification. The joint effect of industrial and 
geographic diversification is negative.
These findings warrant further investigation of the impact of industrial 
diversification. Therefore, Section 4 takes a closer look at the consequences of 
industrial diversification decision. Specifically, we examine stock returns of firms that 
diversify their operations through acquiring another firm from unrelated lines of 
business.
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4. CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH MERGERS
4.1. Introduction
Do managers of the firm act in the best shareholders’ interests when they 
implement corporate diversification strategy? Recent research has attempted to capture 
the effect of corporate diversification on firm’s value (Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment 
and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), Servaes (1996), Hubbard and Palia 
(1999), Matsusaka (1993, 2001), Chevalier (2000), Villalonga (2000), Whited (2001), 
Hyland and Diltz (2001, 2002), Campa and Kedia (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002), 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Schoar (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002)). 
However, the results of these studies are inconclusive. There is no consensus not only 
about the reasons why corporate diversification destroys value, but also about the very 
existence of diversification discount.
Review of corporate diversification literature reveals several controversies. The 
first one is ‘What gets discounted?’ Several studies document that the use of the total 
firm value may produce biased results due to the measurement error in calculations of 
the market value of debt. For example, Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue that corporate 
diversification is neutral with respect to the total firm value. It merely transfers wealth 
from shareholders to the bondholders due to reduction of the firm’s risk, and 
diversification discount is the result of measurement error in value of debt calculations. 
Similarly, Whited (2001) documents that calculations of Tobin’s q contain 
measurement error. Given these findings, it may be difficult to obtain unbiased 
valuation measure. Moreover, corporate diversification may have different valuation
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consequences for shareholders and debtholders. Perhaps, accurate and unambiguous 
investigation of partial effects of corporate diversification can be more informative than 
concentration on more ambitious, but less accurate, goal of total value effect. Therefore, 
this study focuses only on the shareholder value effect of corporate diversification and 
uses stock returns as a performance measure.
Secondly, there is a causality issue. Finding the association of corporate 
diversification with firms’ performance does not constitute causality. For example, 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Campa and Kedia (1999), and Hyland and Diltz (2001) 
document that diversifying firms were traded at a discount even before diversification 
event. Additionally, Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) provide evidence that poor 
performance of firms that later become parts of conglomerates is responsible for sub- 
optimal performance of diversified firms. Therefore, the consequences of corporate 
diversification can be better captured around the time of diversifying event.
The definition of diversifying event requires some clarification. Corporate 
diversification can be achieved either through acquisition, internal growth, or 
restructuring. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) distinguish between economic event 
of diversification of acquisition of new unit from unrelated industry and accounting 
event of increasing the number of reported business segments. Financial Accounting 
and Standards Bard (FASB) Statement 14 requires firms to report segments only if they 
provide at least 10 percent of firm’s total revenues, assets, or profits. Due to this 
reporting requirement, it is difficult to identify the exact timing of diversification event 
for firms that increase number of segments through internal growth. Moreover, the 
process of gradual internal growth may be systematically different and have different
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valuation effects than that of integrating operations of two previously independent 
firms. In order to control for these differences, this study focuses only on economic 
diversification event in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) context.
Another advantage of M&A framework is that it helps to resolve the third 
controversial issue - a problem with constructing a valid benchmark. Most of the 
previous research assumes that a portfolio of stand-alone single-segment firms is a valid 
benchmark for diversified firm valuation (e.g., Lang and Sulz (1994), Berger and Ofek
(1995), Lanomt and Polk (2001)). Several studies question the existence of 
diversification discount by addressing the benchmark issues (e.g., Schoar (2000), 
Villalonga (2000), Lamont and Polk (2001), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002)). They 
conclude that any inferences about the effect of corporate diversification require very 
careful construction of the performance benchmark.
Present study uses pre-merger performance of firms as a benchmark in order to 
assess the impact of the acquisition on the firms’ stock returns. The advantage of this 
approach is that it allows avoiding constructing proxy benchmark that consists of 
“typical” stand alone specialized firms. Instead, post-merger performance of the 
combined firm is compared to pre-merger performance of previously independent firms. 
After the merger, combined firm can be thought of as a portfolio of two previously 
independent firms. Therefore, the portfolio of target and acquiring firms before the 
merger is more accurate benchmark than portfolio of “typical” firms. Moreover, this 
approach allows controlling for any impact of pre-merger performance of both firms.
Our results suggest that acquisitions of independent firms outside of existing 
lines of business have a negative effect on shareholder value. Annual average buy-and-
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hold abnormal return for firms acquiring targets in unrelated lines of business is about 
15% more negative than that of firms acquiring targets in related lines of business. This 
difference cannot be explained by pre-merger performance of target firms. This result is 
not consistent with that of Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). Moreover, targets’ 
characteristic differences, merger transaction size, method of payment, or acquisition 
premia cannot explain this difference. Furthermore, examination of cumulative monthly 
abnormal returns reveals that although acquiring firms in both related and unrelated 
mergers experience post-merger returns decline, the performance of unrelated firms 
deteriorates much faster in related than in related ones.
This study result is limited only to acquisitions of stand-alone firms. Corporate 
diversification through acquisition of divisions or units requires separate analysis in the 
absence of market valuation of these units. Moreover, corporate diversification through 
internal growth is even more challenging because the exact time of diversification event 
is not known. Thus, results of this study cannot be generalized to the universe of all 
firms that diversify their operations. However, it has implications for shareholders of 
firms that diversify through mergers and acquisitions of stand alone firms. Post-merger 
performance of firms that acquire targets in unrelated business is worse than that of 
firms acquiring targets in related lines of business. However, this performance decline is 
weakly associated with diversification per se. While statistically significant, 
diversification explains only 1% of the change in post-merger return changes.
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4.2. Data
The sample consists of U.S. firms, for which completed merger transactions are 
recorded in Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Roster, Acquisitions in the U.S., during 
1990-1999. We select transaction in which both the target and the bidder firms are 
independent publicly traded U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
exchanges. In addition, the bidder firm should acquire 100% of the target firm’s shares. 
Acquisitions of divisions and units, partial acquisitions (less than 100%), increase in 
interest in the firm, acquisition of remaining interest and acquisitions of bankrupt firms 
are excluded.
For each merger, we determine announcement and completion dates. The 
announcement date is when the news about acquisition first appears in the press and is 
reported in Dow Jones News database (Factiva). The news should contain the 
announcement of a definite agreement, a letter of intent, or a tender offer. The dates of 
completion are reported in M&A Roster and are subsequently verified by checking the 
news in Factiva database.
We obtain stock returns for both target and bidder firms from Center for 
Research in Security Prices database (CRSP). We require that both target and bidder 
firms have non-missing stock returns for 15 months before the merger announcement. 
In addition, the bidder firms must have non-missing returns for the 12 months after the 
completion date. We exclude the announcement month to avoid the effect on price 
fluctuations around the announcement. In addition, we exclude 3 months before the 
announcement month to exclude pre-announcement price run up. To avoid the overlap 
in the observation periods, we exclude multiple acquisitions by the same firm within
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three-year interval of the announcement and completion dates. This step ensures that 
both pre-announcement returns and post-completion stock returns are not affected by 
price fluctuations around merger announcement.
Each merger is classified as related or unrelated. The classification is based on 
bidders’ and targets’ lines of business reported in the fiscal year before the merger 
announcement date. The line of business is defined by SIC code of reported segments 
and its description in COMPUSTAT active and research files.
This approach is similar to that of Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). 
However, we use more conservative classification. A merger is related if a bidder has 
prior experience operating in all target’s line(s) of business. That is a target does not 
report any segments outside of bidder’s expertise. It is different from Graham, 
Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) requirement that the acquirer and the target share any four­
digit SIC codes. A merger is unrelated if a bidder acquires a firm from completely 
unrelated lines of business, that is a target and a bidder have no shared lines of business 
in the fiscal year before the merger announcement.
For example, when, in 1998, AIMS Department Stores Inc. (SIC 5331) acquired 
HILLS Stores Co. (SIC code 5331), it was clearly related acquisition. Alternatively, in 
1996, MALLINCKRODT INC. reported operations in three segments (4-digit SIC 
codes 2819, 2834, 2835), all of them in Chemicals and Allied Products (2-digit SIC 
code 28). In 1997, it acquired NELLCOR PURITAN BENNETT INC. operating in 
Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus industry (4-digit SIC code 3845). This 
transaction is classified as unrelated.
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After careful matching by SIC codes and description of business segments, some 
mergers could not be classified unambiguously. In these mergers, the bidder and the 
target firms share some of reported SIC codes, but the overlap is neither 100% nor 0%. 
These mergers are excluded from our analysis.
The distribution of mergers by year and the type of transaction is reported in 
Table 11. The total sample consists of 202 related and 46 unrelated mergers. Several 
previous studies report the declining trend in the corporate diversification (Comment 
and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1996), Dennis, Dennis, and Yost (2002)). Since 
our sample focuses on the 1990s, it is not surprising that the proportion of unrelated 
mergers in our sample is smaller than that in Graham, Lemon, and Wolf (2002) sample, 
which contains 226 related and 130 unrelated mergers during 1980 -  1995 period.
< Insert Table 11 about here >
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4.3.Abnormal Returns
4.3. A. Methodology and Hypotheses
In order to investigate an impact of diversified merger on the bidder’s stock 
performance, we compare returns of the portfolio of target and bidder firms before the 
merger and returns of the combined firm after the merger. First, we examine buy-and- 
hold abnormal returns for 12 months before merger announcement versus and for 12 
months after the completion date. Second, we calculate cumulative monthly abnormal 
returns to examine sock performance over time. We perform this analysis for related 
and unrelated mergers separately.
To calculate the abnormal buy-and-hold return we use the following procedure. 
First, we obtain the monthly stock returns of the bidder and the target firms for the 
months (-15, -4) relative to announcement date and monthly stock returns or the months 
(+1, +12) relative to completion date from Chicago Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database. Next, we calculate compound returns over the 12-months 
corresponding to the pre-announcement year (months -15, -4) and to the post-merger 
year (months +1, +12) for each firm and the corresponding value-weighted index that 
includes all stocks in the CRSP database. The abnormal buy-and-hold return is the 
difference between buy-and-hold return on the stocks and the buy-and-hold return on 
the index. Finally, we average abnormal buy-and-hold returns across firms.
Cumulative monthly abnormal return is the difference between monthly 
cumulative returns of each firm and monthly cumulative returns on the corresponding 
value-weighted CRSP index during the months (-15, -4) relative to the announcement
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date and during months (+1, +12) relative to the completion date. Cumulative monthly 
abnormal stock returns are then averaged across firms.
In addition, we construct value-weighted portfolios of target and bidder firms for 
months (-15, -4). Then we calculate value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
cumulative monthly abnormal returns for each of these portfolios.
This procedure allows comparison of stock returns before the merger to that 
after the merger. Since a merger results in the combined firm that integrates two 
previously independent firms (the target and the bidder) the relevant benchmark for the 
post-merger performance should be the performance of portfolio of these firms before 
the merger. Moreover, accounting for the performance of the target and bidder before 
the merger captures the effect of targets’ and bidders’ pre-merger performances on the 
subsequent performance of the combined firm.
If diversification destroys value, we expect post-merger performance of firms 
acquiring targets in unrelated lines of business be significantly worse than that in related 
mergers. Moreover, the difference between pre-merger performance of the target and 
bidder combined portfolio and post-merger performance of the combined firm should 
be significantly larger for unrelated than for related mergers.
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4.3.B. Results
Table 12, Panel A, reports average (mean and median) buy-and-hold abnormal 
stock returns of targets, bidders, and value-weighted portfolios of target and bidder 
before the merger. Panel B shows average (mean and median) buy-and-hold abnormal 
stock returns of combined firms after the merger. The last column shows results of 
mean and median equality tests. It reports t-statistics for test of mean equality 
hypothesis and Kruskal-Wallis statistics for median equality hypothesis.
Pre-merger average targets’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns are significantly 
negative, consistent with previous findings of Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). 
However, they are almost the same for both related and unrelated acquisitions. The 
difference is only 0.07% [6.33%] and not statistically significant. Moreover, bidders 
that subsequently engage in unrelated acquisitions perform similarly to those in related 
mergers in the year before merger announcement. The difference is only 5.60% [1.65%] 
and not statistically significant. The same is observed for portfolios of target and bidder 
firms. Thus, there is not difference in pre-merger stock performance of targets and 
bidders between groups of related and unrelated mergers.
< Insert Table 12 about here >
However, when we compare post-merger performance of the focused mergers to 
that of diversified mergers we find that firms engaged in unrelated acquisitions perform 
worse than those in related mergers. Both focused and diversified acquisitions lead to 
the negative abnormal returns in the next 12 months after the completion of the merger.
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However, average post-merger returns of diversified acquisitions are -25.81% [-23.09] 
while post-merger returns of focused acquisitions are only -11.32% [-16.93]. The 
difference is 14.49% [6.16%] and is statistically significant.
Figure 1 shows cumulative monthly abnormal returns of targets in focused and 
diversified acquisitions. Both targets of focused and diversified mergers experience 
stock return decline before they are acquired. Moreover, consistent with our previous 
analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, we do not observe any significant 
differences in targets’ stock performance in the pre-merger period.
< Insert Figure 1 about here >
Figure 2 shows cumulative abnormal returns of bidders in focused and 
diversified acquisitions. Consistent with the previous merger literature, bidders are 
performing exceptionally well before merger decision. However, firms that 
subsequently acquire targets outside of their specialization perform better than firms 
that engage in related mergers.
< Insert Figure 2 about here >
When we examine pre-merger performance of portfolios of target and bidder, 
the difference in the stock performance is more pronounced. Portfolios of targets and 
bidders in diversified mergers consistently outperform those in focused mergers. 
Therefore, the impact of targets’ poor pre-merger performance is more pronounced in
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focused mergers. This result is consistent with the fact that, in focused acquisitions, 
targets are larger relative to the bidder and therefore have greater impact on the overall 
portfolio returns.
< Insert Figure 3 about here >
In related mergers, bidders acquire targets that perform worse than that in 
unrelated mergers. After the merger, however, performance of bidders that acquired 
targets in unrelated lines of business begins to deteriorate rapidly (see Figure 4). After 
only three months relative to merger completion, returns of combined firms from 
unrelated businesses begin to fall at a much greater rate than that of related mergers. 
Since the first 12 months after the merger is the period when operations of a bidder and 
a newly acquired firm are merged, it suggests that unrelated mergers have difficulties 
integrating operations in comparison to the focused acquisitions.
< Insert Figure 4 about here >
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4.4. Controlling for Firm-Specific Characteristics and Merger Differences
4.4.A. Methodology and Hypothesis
Further, we investigate the possibility that characteristics of bidders and/or 
targets prior the merger affect the subsequent performance of combined firms. To 
examine this hypothesis, we obtain firms’ characteristics for fiscal years before and 
after the merger from COMPUSTAT active and research files. The list of firms’ 
characteristics is based on the previous research of possible explanations of stock 
returns (Daniel and Titman (1997), Brennan et al (1998), Titman et al (2001)) 
Additionally, we examine whether merger characteristics, such as size of the 
transaction, acquisition premia, and method of payment, can explain differences in 
subsequent performance.
Finally, post-merger returns are regressed on prior targets’ and bidders’ returns, 
set of firms’ characteristics, merger characteristics, and diversification dummy. We 
estimate the following regression:
Ri = a, + b; Xj +C; Dj + Gj (4) 
where, R; is the post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns minus pre-merger buy-and- 
hold abnormal returns on value-weighted portfolio of target and bidder.
DDUM is the dummy variable that equals to 1 if merger is unrelated and 0 otherwise.
X; is the vector of firms’ and mergers’ characteristics that includes the following 
variables:
TRET (-1) -  targets’ pre-merger annual abnormal buy-and-hold returns 
BRET (-1) - bidders’ pre-merger annual abnormal buy-and-hold returns
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
PREMIA -  4-week acquisition premia paid by acquirers
PAY -  method of payment dummy, that takes a value of 1 if target was acquired for 
cash and zero otherwise
SIZE -  the size of merger transaction (in millions of dollars)
TDIVYLD (-1) -  targets’ dividend yield in the fiscal year before the merger 
BDIVYLD (-1) -  bidders’ dividend yield in the fiscal year before the merger 
BDIVYLD -  bidders’ dividend yield in the fiscal year after the merger 
TCAPX/SALES (-1) -  targets’ ratio of capital expenditures to sales in the fiscal year 
before the merger
BCAPX/SALES (-1) -  bidders’ ratio of capital expenditures to sales in the fiscal year 
before the merger
BCAPX/SALES -  bidders’ ratio of capital expenditures to sales in the fiscal year after 
the merger
TEBIT/SALES (-1) -  targets’ ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales in the 
fiscal year before the merger
BEBIT/SALES (-1) -  bidders’ ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales in the 
fiscal year before the merger
BEBIT/SALES -  bidders’ ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales in the 
fiscal year after the merger
TDAT (-1) -  targets’ debt ratio in the fiscal year before the merger 
BDAT (-1) -  bidders’ debt ratio in the fiscal year before the merger 
BDAT -  bidders’ debt ratio in the fiscal year after the merger 
TSALE (-1) -  log of targets’ sales in the fiscal year before the merger
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BSALE (-1) -  log of bidders’ sales in the fiscal year before the merger 
BSALE -  log of bidders’ sales in the fiscal year after the merger
If the act of diversification has an impact on the post-merger returns of the 
combined firm, the coefficient of the dummy variable should be significant even after 
controlling for pre-merger targets’ and bidders’ performance, targets’ and bidders’ firm- 
specific characteristics, and merger transaction differences.
4.4.B. Results
Table 13, (Panel A) reports characteristics of targets and bidders before and after 
the merger. Firms that engage in unrelated acquisitions are larger than those involved in 
related mergers, measured by both total assets and sales. However, the size of targets in 
both types of mergers is almost identical. Thus, relative size of targets in related 
acquisitions is larger than that in unrelated mergers. Larger target firms should be more 
difficult to incorporate into existing operations of the bidder and should have greater 
impact on the subsequent performance of the bidder. However, our analysis of stock 
returns is not consistent with this observation. Post-merger performance of firms in 
related mergers is better than that in unrelated mergers. Targets’ relative size does not 
seem to have any effect on the post-merger returns.
Profitability, measured by EBIT/Sales ratio, does not differ between related and 
unrelated merger targets and bidders neither before nor after the merger. The same is 
true for capital expenditures, dividend yield, and level of debt. These findings indicate 
that targets’ characteristics cannot explain differences in the post-merger stock returns.
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Another possibility is that characteristics of the merger transaction can provide 
some explanation for post-merger return differences. It may be that the bidder knows 
less about the nature of unrelated business, while bidders in related mergers can 
appraise the target properly. We investigate this possibility by comparing the 
transaction size and 4-week premia (reported in M&A Roster). It turns out that in 
related mergers bidders actually pay more than in unrelated mergers, measured by both 
size of the transaction and 4-week premia (Table 13, Panel B).
In addition, we examine the method of payment used in acquisition. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that method by which an investment is financed conveys an 
important information. When the firm uses stock to finance an investment, it means that 
management believes that the stock is overvalued. Alternatively, the difference in 
method of payment reflects the confidence of the acquirer in potential gains and his 
willingness to assume (or to share) the risks and potential gains of the acquisition. Stock 
payment indicates that the bidder views the acquisition as a risky project and wants to 
share the risk with target shareholders (Rappaport and Sirower (1999)). However, in our 
sample, the proportions of cash transaction are similar across related and unrelated 
mergers. The proportion of stock payments is higher for related transactions. Since we 
observe that pre-merger abnormal returns are higher for unrelated bidders our finding is 
not consistent with over-valuation hypothesis (Mayers and Majluf (1984)). Neither it is 
consistent with risk hypothesis, since larger proportion of related (supposedly safer) 
mergers used stocks (54%) in comparison to diversified mergers (41%).
< Insert Tab lei 3 about here >
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Next, we address the question to what extent changes in the stock returns 
associated with merger can be explained by firms’ characteristics before and after 
merger. Moreover, we control for transaction characteristic differences, such as 
transaction size, method of payment, and acquisition premia. Table 14 reports 
regression results. Regression results are reported only for variables that have a 
significant impact on the post merger return changes. Variables that are not statistically 
significant and do not add explanatory power to the regression are omitted.
The diversification dummy variable is statistically significant even after 
controlling for firm specific characteristics, prior returns, transaction size, premia, and 
method of payment. In addition to diversification dummy variable, only pre-merger 
returns and pre-merger and post-merger debt ratios have any significant impact on post­
merger stock return changes.
Both targets’ and bidders’ pre-merger abnormal returns have a negative effect 
on the returns change. However, bidders’ pre-merger returns have the most explanatory 
power. Bidders’ pre-merger abnormal returns alone explain 41% of subsequent return 
changes, while targets’ pre-merger abnormal returns add only 2%. Superior 
performance of bidders that subsequently engage in unrelated mergers and their poor 
post-merger performance is consistent with overconfidence hypothesis (Roll (1986), 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)).
Debt variables together add 3% of explanatory power. The pre-merger level of 
debt of the target is negatively associated with changes in post-merger returns while 
bidders’ pre-merger debt level is positively associated with post-merger return changes. 
During merger, bidders assume targets’ debt in addition to their own existing debt. In
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some cases, bidders have to borrow more to finance an acquisition. In our sample, we 
find negative relation of post-merger level of debt to return changes.
Negative impact of bidders’ post-merger level of debt is not consistent with 
usually positive role that debt has on stock returns (e.g. Jensen (1986)). Firms in 
unrelated mergers increase their level of debt above the pre-merger level of either 
bidder or the target. It means that in addition to assuming targets’ debt they had to 
borrow more. It is consistent with increasing debt capacity argument for diversification. 
However, it seems that firms, that acquire unrelated businesses, borrow more than 
optimal amount and transfer wealth from shareholders to the debtholders (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)).
< Insert Table 14 about here >
Diversification dummy explains only 1% of post-merger return changes. This 
result suggests that, while statistically and economically significant, the observed 
negative effect of corporate diversification on post-merger return changes is not the 
major factor that affects post-merger under-performance.
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4.5. Results Summary
This section examines the impact of the unrelated mergers on subsequent stock 
returns. The context of mergers and accusations allows investigation of the 
diversification effect directly. Moreover, this approach does not require a construction 
of the artificial and approximate benchmark, such as average industry performance or 
propensity to diversify. Since both merged firms were independent publicly traded firms 
before the merger, their performance is known and can be compared to subsequent 
performance of the combined firm.
Our results suggest that acquisitions of independent firms outside of existing 
lines of business have a negative effect on shareholder value. Annual average buy-and- 
hold abnormal returns for firms acquiring targets in unrelated lines of business is about 
15% more negative than that of firms acquiring targets in related lines of business. Pre­
merger targets’ performance or differences in firm-specific characteristics cannot 
explain this post-merger return difference. This result is not consistent with that of 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). Moreover, post-merger return changes cannot be 
explained by mergers’ characteristics, such as transaction size, method of payment or 
acquisition premia. Furthermore, examination of cumulative monthly abnormal returns 
reveals that although acquiring firms in both related and unrelated mergers experience 
post-merger returns decline, the performance of unrelated firms deteriorates much faster 
in unrelated than in related acquisitions.
However, regression analysis indicates that corporate diversification is not the 
major factor explaining poor post-merger performance. While statistically significant, 
diversification explains only 1% of the change in post-merger return changes in
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comparison to 41% explained by bidders’ pre-merger returns. This result is more 
consistent with overconfidence hypothesis (Roll (1986)). Managers of firms that 
experience superior pre-merger performance are overconfident in their appraisal of 
future merger benefits. Our results are also consistent with studies that document long­
term post-event under-performance and returns mean reversal (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1993), Lakonisok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)).
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5. CONCLUSION
Prior literature (see Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger 
and Ofek (1995, 1996), and Servaes (1996), among others) documents that majority of 
diversified firms sell at a discount in comparison to focused firms. This negative 
relation between corporate diversification and firm value suggests that stock returns of 
diversified firms should be affected as well. This study concentrates on the analysis of 
stock returns of diversified versus specialized firms.
The major underlying assumption in the prior literature is that value of divisions 
of diversified firms can be approximated by value of a portfolio of stand-alone 
specialized firms. However, recent research in this area suggests that divisions of 
diversified firms are fundamentally different from stand-alone firms in many 
characteristics (e.g., Villalonga (2000), Mansi and Reeb (2002)). Therefore, this study 
does not employ the imputed value methodology. Instead, we examine two 
complementing hypotheses. First, corporate diversification associates with systematic 
risk differences between diversified and specialized firms. Second, corporate 
diversification has value effect in addition to other systematic and firm-specific factors.
In this study, we have analyzed long-term stock performance of diversified firms 
in comparison to specialized firms. With respect to expected stock returns, low market 
valuation (low Tobin’s q or high book-to-market ratio) of diversified firms implies risk 
differential, mispricing, or corporate diversification being a significant firm 
characteristic affecting value and stock returns. Therefore, we examine stock returns of 
diversified and specialized firms using both factor-pricing model (Fama and French
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
62
(1992,1993), Carhart (1997)) and characteristic-based model (Daniel and Titman 
(1997), Brennon, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)).
In addition, the extant literature documents that there are two dimensions 
corporate diversification -  industrial and geographic. Recent studies document that 
these types of corporate diversification have separate and joint affect on firm value 
(Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999), Dennis, Dennis and Yost (2002)). Therefore this 
study explores both sides of corporate diversification.
The investigation of the comprehensive sample of publicly traded firms over the 
last 20 years yields several interesting results. First, after declining since 1980s and 
through the mid-1990s, there is an increase in both industrial and geographic 
diversification in at the end of 1990s. This diversification trend reversal is rather 
puzzling because it is not consistent with negative effect of corporate diversification and 
efficient markets.
Second, we found that, depending on the industrial or geographic 
diversification, firm’s characteristics differ. These characteristics include those affecting 
stock returns, e.g. size and book-to-market ratio (Fama and French (1992, 1993)) and 
capital expenditures (Titman et al (2002)). It implies that diversified firms are not just a 
mechanical collection of single-segment units. When several business segments are 
combined, the resulting entity acquires fundamentally different characteristics and, 
therefore, is no longer comparable to the portfolio of single-segment firms. This result 
suggests that previous diversification discount findings that employ imputed value 
technique (Berger and Ofec (1995)) may be driven by characteristics differences among 
diversified and specialized firms.
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Third, investigation of returns of portfolios of diversified and focused firms 
shows that they do not differ. This result is not consistent with corporate diversification 
being a value destroying activity. However, this result is driven by significantly 
different loadings on the risk factors. Single-segment firms are smaller and their stock 
returns load positively on the size factor (SMB). At the same time, they have lower 
book-to-market ratio leading to positive loading on the value factor (HML). Diversified 
firms’ stock returns have the opposite trend. They are large and have higher book-to- 
market ratios. Therefore, negative loading on SMB offsets their positive loading on 
HML. This result is confirmed by examination of abnormal returns on the zero- 
investment portfolio, which takes a long position in the specialized firms and short 
position in diversified firms. Abnormal returns on the zero-investment portfolio are not 
significantly different from zero except for geographically diversified firms.
Fourth, our results suggest that, in 1990s, industrially focused firms with 
operations abroad were rewarded more than purely domestic firms were. This result is 
robust to the model specification and does not change whether the four-factor model or 
the characteristic-based model is used. This result runs contrary to the finding of 
Dennis, Dennis, and Yost (2002) that geographic diversification destroys value. 
However, it confirms previous findings that multinationality is a valuable asset (Doukas 
and Travlos (1988); Doukas (1995); Morck and Yeung (1991,1998); Doukas and 
Pantzalis (1999); Bodnar et al (1999)).
Fifth, our methodology did not allow for unambiguous results of the effect of 
industrial diversification on stock returns. While four-factor model does not show any 
significant effect of industrial diversification on stock returns, this result is not robust.
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In the characteristic based model framework, industrial diversification has a significant 
negative influence stock returns in the 1980s. Moreover, the effect of geographic 
diversification in the 1990s seems to depend on industrial diversification with joint 
effect of industrial and geographic diversification being negative.
To answer the question of the impact of corporate industrial diversification of 
the stock returns, Section 4 presents a study that focuses on diversifying event. 
Specifically, we examine a smaller sample of firms that diversified their operations 
through mergers and acquisitions. We compare combined performance of the target and 
the bidder before the merger to the performance of the merged entity after the merger 
has been completed. In order to test the impact of the corporate diversification on the 
subsequent performance of the acquiring firm we compare unrelated (diversifying) 
mergers to the mergers in the same line of business.
The context of mergers and accusations allows investigation of the 
diversification effect directly. Moreover, this approach does not require a construction 
of the artificial and approximate benchmark, such as average industry performance or 
propensity to diversify. Since both merged firms were independent publicly traded firms 
before the merger, their performance is known and can be compared to subsequent 
performance of the combined firm.
Results suggest that acquisitions of independent firms outside of existing lines 
of business have a negative effect on shareholder value. Annual average buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for firms acquiring targets in unrelated lines of business is about 15% 
more negative than that of firms acquiring targets in related lines of business. Pre­
merger targets’ performance or differences in firm-specific characteristics cannot
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explain this post-merger return difference. This result is not consistent with that of 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002). Moreover, post-merger return changes cannot be 
explained by mergers’ characteristics, such as transaction size, method of payment or 
acquisition premia. Furthermore, examination of cumulative monthly abnormal returns 
reveals that although acquiring firms in both related and unrelated mergers experience 
post-merger returns decline, the performance of unrelated firms deteriorates much faster 
in unrelated than in related acquisitions.
However, regression analysis indicates that corporate diversification is not the 
major factor explaining poor post-merger performance. While statistically significant, 
diversification explains only 1% of the change in post-merger return changes in 
comparison to 41% explained by bidders’ pre-merger returns. This result is more 
consistent with overconfidence hypothesis (Roll (1986)). Managers of firms that 
experience superior pre-merger performance are overconfident in their appraisal of 
future merger benefits. Our results are also consistent with studies that document long­
term post-event under-performance and returns mean reversal (Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1993), Lakonisok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)).
This study contributes to the corporate diversification literature in several ways. 
First, we investigate the value of the corporate diversification from the investor’s 
perspective and use a methodology different from that of other studies. Instead of 
constructing artificial portfolios of single-segment firms that match diversified firms by 
size and industry, we employ a real-life investment strategy. We do not rely on the 
matching technique of Berger and Ofek (1995), because single-segment firms are 
fundamentally different from segments of diversified firm in many dimensions.
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Second, we address the puzzling finding of geographic diversification discount 
by Dennis et al (2002). Applying different approach, we investigate the impact of 
geographic diversification on the shareholders’ wealth and find support for value 
increasing effect of geographic diversification.
Third, this study addresses the issue of causality and examines the effect of the 
corporate diversification at the time of diversifying event (mergers and acquisitions). 
While result of this investigation is limited to acquisitions of stand-alone firms, it has 
important implications for assessment of managerial decision to diversify with respect 
to shareholders’ value.
The overall results can be summarized as follows. Corporate diversification 
changes the nature of the firm. Not only the composition of the firm becomes different, 
the overall firm’s risk characteristics change. Thus, corporate diversification has an 
impact on firm value through changes of the firm’s characteristics. However, corporate 
diversification per se is an important firm characteristic that affects stock returns in 
addition to other firm-specific characteristics. At least with respect to geographic 
diversification, there is no doubt that the effect on the firm’s value is beneficial. 
However, impact of industrial diversification seems to depend on many other 
conditions, such as other firm-specific characteristics (including geographic 
diversification) and characteristics of the segment being added to the firm during 
diversifying event.
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Distribution of Firms in Single-Segment and Multi-Segment Portfolios by Portfolio Formation Year
At the end of June of each year (1981-2000) all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms are allocated into one o f two portfolios according to the number o f reported segments by SIC code: portfolio 
o f single-segment firms or portfolio o f multi-segment firms. The data on segments are collected from COMPUSTAT research and active files at the fiscal year ending year t-1 relative to the 
portfolio formation year t. Segment is defined by reported operations and sales in the same SIC code. If  a firm reports operations and sales in several segments with the same SIC code, these 
segments are treated as one. Firms that report sales generated by only one segment are classified as single-segment firms. Firms with two or more segments are classified as multi-segment 
firms. Firms with segments in 1-digit SIC code of 0 ,6  or 9 and firms with total sales less than $10 million are excluded.
Panel A: Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Firms 1024 1086 1401 1551 1664 1731 1851 1790 1956 1973 1993 2104 2320 2620 2885 3150 3477 3580 2763 2330 2162
Multi-Segment Firms 1117 1103 1235 1200 1133 1055 972 913 840 792 774 755 764 775 777 766 754 717 961 861 913
Total 2141 2189 2636 2751 2797 2786 2823 2703 2796 2765 2767 2859 3084 3395 3662 3916 4231 4297 3724 3191 3076
Percent of Multi- 
Segment Firms
52% 50% 47% 44% 41% 38% 34% 34% 30% 29% 28% 26% 25% 23% 21% 20% 18% 17% 26% 27% 30%
Average Number of Segments 
per Firm
2.11 2.05 1.95 1.86 1.77 1.70 1.62 1.61 1.51 1.48 1.47 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.28 1.26 1.39 1.40 1.52
Average Number of Segments 
per Multi-Segment Firm
3.13 3.09 3.02 2.97 2.90 2.84 2.79 2.80 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.66 2.63 2.58 2.59 2.58 2.56 2.55 2.51 2.48 2.77
Panel B: Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Firms 1203 1266 1596 1735 1830 1895 2007 1943 2094 2111 2128 2237 2464 2763 3027 3299 3627 3718 2984 2542 2323
Multi-Segment Firms 938 923 1040 1016 967 891 816 760 702 654 639 622 620 632 635 617 604 579 740 649 752
Total 2141 2189 2636 2751 2797 2786 2823 2703 2796 2765 2767 2859 3084 3395 3662 3916 4231 4297 3724 3191 3076
Percent of Multi- 
Segment Firms
44% 42% 39% 37% 35% 32% 29% 28% 25% 24% 23% 22% 20% 19% 17% 16% 14% 13% 20% 20% 24%
Average Number of Segments 
per Firm
1.79 1.75 1.68 1.61 1.56 1.51 1.45 1.44 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.31 1.28 1.26 1.24 1.22 1.19 1.18 1.26 1.26 1.37
Average Number of Segments 
per Multi-Segment Firm













Distribution of Firms in Single-Segment and Multi-Segment Portfolios for Domestic and Geographically Diversified Firms by Portfolio Formation Year
At the end of June of each year (1981-2000) all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms are allocated into one o f two portfolios according to the number o f  reported segments by SIC code: portfolio 
o f single-segment films or portfolio o f multi-segment firms. The data on segments are collected from COMPUSTAT research and active files at the fiscal year ending year t-1 relative to the 
portfolio formation year t. Segment is defined by reported operations and sales in the same SIC code. I f  a firm reports operations and sales in several segments with the same SIC code, these 
segments are treated as one. Firms that report sales generated by only one segment are classified as single-segment firms. Firms with two or more segments are classified as multi-segment 
firms. Firms with segments in 1-digit SIC code of 0, 6 or 9 and firms with total sales less than $10 million are excluded. Independently firms are classified as geographically diversified if  they 
report more than 10% of foreign sales.
Panel A l:  Domestic Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Firms 807 866 1134 1267 1364 1406 1470 1407 1519 1529 1535 1591 1760 2026 2316 2445 2691 2737 2014 1621 1675
Multi-Segment Firms 753 754 890 870 823 770 688 629 589 555 539 506 524 543 545 525 504 462 586 479 627
Total Domestic Firms 1560 1620 2024 2137 2187 2176 2158 2036 2108 2084 2074 2097 2284 2569 2861 2970 3195 3199 2600 2100 2302
Multi-Segment Firms as a 
Percent of Domestic Firms
48% 47% 44% 41% 38% 35% 32% 31% 28% 27% 26% 24% 23% 21% 19% 18% 16% 14% 23% 23% 27%
Multi-Segment Domestic Firms 
as a Percent of Total Sample 
Firms
35% 34% 34% 32% 29% 28% 24% 23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 15% 13% 12% 11% 16% 15% 20%
Panel A2: Domestic Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Finns 931 990 1267 1393 1475 1523 1580 1511 1615 1628 1629 1686 1857 2127 2412 2540 2792 2828 2148 1729 1783
Multi-Segment Finns 629 630 757 744 712 653 578 525 493 456 445 411 427 442 449 430 403 371 452 371 519
Total Domestic Firms 1560 1620 2024 2137 2187 2176 2158 2036 2108 2084 2074 2097 2284 2569 2861 2970 3195 3199 2600 2100 2302
Multi-Segment Firms as a 
Percent of Domestic Firms
40% 39% 37% 35% 33% 30% 27% 26% 23% 22% 21% 20% 19% 17% 16% 14% 13% 12% 17% 18% 23%
Multi-Segment Domestic Firms 
as a Percent of Total Sample 
Firms













Panel B l:  Geographically Diversified Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Firms 217 220 267 284 300 325 381 383 437 444 458 513 560 594 569 705 786 843 749 709 487
Multi-Segment Firms 364 349 345 330 310 285 284 284 251 237 235 249 240 232 232 241 250 255 375 382 287
Total Geographically Diversified 
Firms
581 569 612 614 610 610 665 667 688 681 693 762 800 826 801 946 1036 1098 1124 1091 774
Multi-Segment Firms as a 
Percent of Geographically 
Diversified Firms
63% 61% 56% 54% 51% 47% 43% 43% 36% 35% 34% 33% 30% 28% 29% 25% 24% 23% 33% 35% 37%
Multi-Segment Geographically 
Diversified Firms as a Percent 
of Total Sample Firms
17% 16% 13% 12% 11% 10% 10% 11% 9% 9% 8% 9% 8% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 10% 12% 9%
Panel B2: Geographically Diversified Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
Portfolio Formation Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Single-Segment Firms 272 276 329 342 355 372 427 432 479 483 499 551 607 636 615 759 835 890 836 813 541
Multi-Segment Firms 309 293 283 272 255 238 238 235 209 198 194 211 193 190 186 187 201 208 288 278 233
Total Geographically Diversified 
Firms
581 569 612 614 610 610 665 667 688 681 693 762 800 826 801 946 1036 1098 1124 1091 774
Multi-Segment Firms as a 
Percent of Geographically 
Diversified Firms
53% 51% 46% 44% 42% 39% 36% 35% 30% 29% 28% 28% 24% 23% 23% 20% 19% 19% 26% 25% 30%
Multi-Segment Geographically 
Diversified Firms as a Percent 
of Total Sample Firms













Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Industrial and Geographic Diversification
Portfolios are formed at the end o f June o f each year (1981-2000) according to SIC code and the level o f foreign sales (see Table 2). Size and book-to-market are calculated using Fama and 
French methodology.
Panels A and B show the average number o f firms in the corresponding portfolio, size and book-to-market ratio, Debt-to-Total Assets ratio, Capital expenditures to total sales ratio, EBIT to 
total sales ratio, and dividend yield averaged across firms for each year and than averaged over the years in each time period.
Size is the market capitalization o f the firm at the end o f June o f the portfolio formation year t collected from CRSP. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as follows: BE/ME, where BE is the 
COMPUSTAT book value o f  stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value o f preferred stock. The book value o f preferred stock is 
estimated depending on the availability using redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order). BE is calculated for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. Firms with negative BE are 
excluded from the sample. ME is the market capitalization o f the firm at the end o f December o f calendar year t-1.
Panel C shows the returns on the corresponding portfolios. W e report average monthly raw returns, average monthly abnormal returns, buy and hold returns, and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Average monthly raw returns are returns on the value-weighted corresponding portfolio. Average monthly abnormal returns are the portfolio returns in the excess o f the value-weighted 
market portfolio. The abnormal buy and hold returns are the monthly returns compounded over the one-year holding period less the buy and hold returns on the market. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are the sum of monthly returns over the one-year period less o f the cumulative market returns. Market portfolio consists o f all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms in CRSP.
We use three time periods: 1981 -  2000,1981 -1990, and 1991 -  2000.
Panel A: Num ber of Firms, Size, and Book-to-Market Ratio
Number of Firms Size (Millions of $) Book-to Market Ratio
Domestic Firms Geographically 
Diversified Firms All
Domestic Firms Geographically 
Diversified Firms All
Domestic Firms Geographically 
Diversified Firms All
1981-2000
Single-segment 1675 487 2163 496.98 1417.03 713.90 0.87 0.74 0.84
[1783 ] [541] [2324] [519.30] [ 1507.77 ] [ 758.89 ] [ 0.88 ] [0.75] [0.85]
Multi-segment 627 287 914 841.35 3079.67 1593.60 0.95 0.83 0.91
[519] [233 ] [752] [ 828.68 ] [ 3243.16 ] [ 1641.26] [0.95] [0.84] [0.91]
All 2302 774 579.98 1988.88 0.90 0.78
1981 -1990
Single-segment 1277 326 1603 293.88 829.50 401.83 0.92 0.81 0.90
[ 1391 ] [377] [1768 ] [ 307.31 ] [ 900.42 ] [ 433.36 ] [ 0.94 ] [0.83] [0.91]
Multi-segment 732 304 1036 481.67 1819.75 875.00 1.03 0.94 1.00
[618] [253] [871] [481.37] [ 1891.81 ] [ 892.85 ] [ 1-01 ] [ 0.94 ] [ 0.99 ]
All 2009 630 356.06 1274.55 0.96 0.88
1991 -2000 
Single-segment 2074 649 2723 700.07 2004.56 1025.97 0.83 0.67 0.79
[ 2175 ] [704] [ 2879 ] [731.30] [2115.13] [ 1084.43 ] [ 0.83 ] [0.67] [ 0.79 ]
Multi-segment 521 269 790 1201.03 4339.59 2312.20 0.87 0.72 0.82
[420] [214] [634] [ 1175.99] [ 4594.52 ] [ 2389.68 ] [ 0.88 ] [0.74] [0.84]













Panel B: Debt, Capital Expenditures, Earnings, and Dividend Yield


















Single-segment 24.29% 19.60% 23.26% 11.43% 8.41% 10.74% 5.89% 7.19% 6.24% 1.36% 1.17% 1.32%
[ 24.57% ] [ 20.25% ] [ 23.59% ] [11.14%] [ 8.19% ] [ 10.91%] [ 5.41% ] [ 6.92% ] [ 6.48% ] [ 1.35% ] [ 1.27%] [ 1.44% ]
Multi-segment 27.72% 24.82% 26.83% 8.77% 8.64% 8.95% 6.90% 7.27% 7.11% 2.15% 2.54% 2.17%
[27.57%] [ 24.56% ] [ 26.63% ] [ 8.02% ] [ 7.83% ] [8.12%] [ 6.21% ] [ 7.30% ] [ 6.61% ] [1.96%] [ 2.64% ] [ 2.06% ]
All 25.17% 21.49% 10.81% 8.37% 6.02% 7.20% 1.56% 1.64%
1981-1990
Single-segment 25.74% 20.65% 24.71% 11.68% 8.97% 11.13% 8.62% 8.67% 8.64% 1.96% 1.59% 1.88%
[ 26.09% ] [ 21.33% ] [ 25.07% ] [11.10%] [ 8.02% ] [11.37%] [ 7.38% ] [ 8.01% ] [ 8.83% ] [ 1.89% ] [ 1.77% ] [ 2.06% ]
Multi-segment 28.11% 24.54% 27.06% 8.30% 8.74% 8.94% 7.74% 7.85% 7.88% 2.69% 3.32% 2.69%
[ 27.78% ] [ 24.33% ] [ 26.77% ] [ 7.29% ] [ 8.75% ] [8.14%] [ 7.02% ] [ 7.88% ] [ 7.33% ] [ 2.41% ] [ 3.41% ] [ 2.50% ]
All 26.60% 22.47% 10.80% 8.70% 8.29% 8.38% 2.19% 2.23%
1991-2000
Single-segment 22.84% 18.55% 21.81% 11.18% 7.85% 10.35% 3.15% 5.71% 3.85% 0.75% 0.74% 0.75%
[ 23.05% ] [19.17%] [ 22.10% ] [11.19%] [ 8.36% ] [ 10.45% ] [ 3.44% ] [ 5.82% ] [ 4.12% ] [ 0.82% ] [ 0.78% ] [ 0.81% ]
Multi-segment 27.34% 25.10% 26.60% 9.25% 8.53% 8.96% 6.05% 6.69% 6.34% 1.61% 1.76% 1.65%
[ 27.35% ] [ 24.80% ] [ 26.49% ] [ 8.75% ] [6.91%] [8.10%] [ 5.39% ] [ 6.72% ] [ 5.88% ] [ 1.50% ] [ 1.87%] [ 1.61% ]














For each diversification category, this table reports average monthly raw returns, average monthly abnormal returns, buy and hold abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Average monthly raw returns are returns on the value-weighted corresponding portfolio. Average monthly abnormal returns are the portfolio raw returns less the value-weighted market 
portfolio returns. The abnormal buy and hold returns are the monthly returns compounded over the one-year holding period less the buy and hold returns on the market. Cumulative abnormal 



























Single-segment 1.17% 1.37% 1.27% -0.04% 0.15% 0.05% -0.62% 2.29% 0.70% -0.52% 1.84% 0.63%
[ 1.18%] [ 1.35%] [ 1.26%] [ -0.03%] [ 0.13%] [ 0.05%] [ -0.43%] [ 2.00%] [ 0.63%] [ -0.36%] [ 1.59%] [ 0.57%]
Multi-segment 1.11% 1.28% 1.21% -0.10% 0.07% 0.00% -1.35% 1.02% 0 .01% -1.24% 0.85% -0.04%
[ 1.11%] [ 1.30%] [ 1.22%] [ -0.10%] [ 0.09%] [ 0 .01%] [ -1.35%] [ 1.21%] [ 0 .10%] [-1.19%] [ 1.06%] [ 0.07%]
All 1.14% 1.35% -0.07% 0.14% -0.95% 1.99% -0.85% 1.63%
1981 -1990
Single-segment 1.30% 1.17% 1.24% 0.09% -0.04% 0.03% 1.01% -0.69% 0 .12% 1.07% -0.49% 0.32%
[1.32%] [ 1.21%] [ 1.26%] [ 0.11%] [ 0.00%] [ 0.05%] [ 1.34%] [ -0.09%] [ 0.52%] [ 1.36%] [ 0 .02%] [ 0.65%]
Multi-segment 1.16% 1.44% 1.33% -0.05% 0.23% 0.12% -0 .66% 2.96% 1.43% -0.60% 2.76% 1.39%
[ 1.10%] [ 1.43%] [ 1.30%] [-0 .11%] [ 0.22%] [ 0.09%] [ -1.40%] [ 2.80%] [ 1.11%] [-1.31%] [ 2.63%] [ 1.10%]
All 1.23% 1.33% 0.02% 0.12% 0.22% 1.41% 0.29% 1.42%
1991-2000
Single-segment 1.04% 1.56% 1.30% -0.18% 0.35% 0.08% -2.24% 5.28% 1.28% -2 .12% 4.17% 0.95%
[1.04%] [ 1.48%] [ 1.26%] [-0.17%] [ 0.26%] [ 0.04%] [ -2 .21%] [ 4.08%] [ 0.75%] [ -2.08%] [ 3.17%] [ 0.48%]
Multi-segment 1.06% 1.13% 1.09% -0.16% -0.09% -0 .12% -2.04% -0.91% -1.41% -1.87% -1.06% -1.48%
[ 1.13%] [ 1.17%] [ 1.14%] [ -0.09%] [ -0.04%] [ -0.08%] [-1.31%] [ -0.38%] [ -0.91%] [-1.07%] [ -0.51%] [ -0.96%]














Four-Factor Time-Series Regressions for Monthly Excess Returns for Portfolios of Single-Segment and Multi-Segment Firms, and Zero-Investment 
Portfolios.
Ris- R f= a, + b,(Rm- Rf) + s,SMB +h, HML + m, MOMENTUM + c, (1);
RiM-  Rf= Si +  bjfRe,- Rf) + Si SMB+ h, HML + m, MOMENTUM + d  (2);
Ris-  R,m= a, + bi(R,n- Rf) + s, SMB+ hi HML + nii MOMENTUM + e, (3)
R;s -  Rf are the monthly excess returns on value-weighted portfolio o f  single-segment firms. R ,M-  Rf are the monthly excess returns on value-weighted portfolio o f  multi-segment firms. The 
formation of portfolios o f single-and multi-segment firms is described in Table 1. Portfolios are formed on July 1st o f each year in the 1981 -1999 period and are held for 12 months. If  a  firm 
stops trading during the year, its returns are replaced by the mean returns o f the portfolio. Returns on portfolios are calculated using CRSP. R js-  RiM are the monthly returns on the zero- 
investment portfolio formed by taking a long position in the portfolio o f single-segment firms and short position in the portfolio o f multi-segment firms. Rf is the monthly Treasury bill rate. 
Rn,— Rf are the value-weighted excess market returns on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms. SMB (small minus big) is the difference each month between the returns on small firms and big 
firms. HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between return on a portfolio o f high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio o f low book-to-market stocks. 
MOMENTUM is the a  momentum factor, constructed from six value-weight portfolios formed using independent sorts on size and prior return o f NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. It is 
the average o f the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios minus the average o f the returns on two low prior return portfolios. Prior return is measured from month -12 to - 
2. All returns are in percent.
Factors are obtained from K. French web page.
Regressions are performed for the whole time period 07/1981-06/2000 and two sub-periods corresponding to 1980s and 1990s. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Regression Portfolios of Single-Segment Firms 
(1)




Time Period a b s h m Adj.
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Panel B: Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
Regression Portfolios of Single-Segment Firms 
(11




Time Period a b s h in Adj.
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Mergers Distribution by Year of Completion
The sample consists of U.S. firms, for which completed merger transactions are recorded in 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Roster, Acquisitions in the U.S., during 1990-1999. We select 
only independent publicly traded U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchanges 
that were 100% acquired. Acquisitions of divisions and units, partial acquisitions (less than 
100%), increase in interest in the firm, acquisition of remaining interest and acquisitions of 
bankrupt firms are excluded.
For both target and bidder firms in the sample, we obtain the segment data from COMPUSTAT 
active and research files for the fiscal year ending prior to the announcement date. A merger is 
classified as related or unrelated. A merger is related if a bidder has prior experience operating in 
the target’s line(s) of business. Line of business is defined by SIC code of reported segments and 
its description in the fiscal year before the merger. A merger is unrelated if bidders acquire firms 
from completely unrelated lines of business. Some mergers could not be identified 
unambiguously as related or unrelated. These mergers are excluded from our analysis.
Completion
Year
All Mergers Related Unrelated Mixed Diversified Mergers 
as a Percent 
of Total Mergers
1991 19 14 1 4 5.26%
1992 6 4 0 2 0.00%
1993 15 9 1 5 6.67%
1994 22 17 2 3 9.09%
1995 29 18 5 6 17.24%
1996 47 30 7 10 14.89%
1997 55 32 10 13 18.18%
1998 62 44 11 7 17.74%
1999 61 34 9 18 14.75%
Total 316 202 46 68 14.56%




Abnormal buy-and-hold returns before merger are calculated months (-15, -4) relative to announcement 
date. Returns after the merger are calculated for months (+1, +12) relative to completion date. Raw returns 
are obtained from the CRSP database. Next, we calculate compound returns over the 12-months 
corresponding to the pre-announcement year (months -15, -4) and to the post-merger year (months +1, 
+12) for each firm and the corresponding value-weighted index that includes all stocks in the CRSP 
database. The abnormal buy-and-hold return is the difference between the buy-and-hold return on the 
stocks and the buy-and-hold return on the index. Finally, we average abnormal buy-and-hold returns across 
firms.
Returns change is the difference between post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns and pre-merger buy- 
and-hold returns on value-weighted portfolio of target and bidder.
Last column reports results of mean and median equality tests.
**, * denote statistical significance at 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel A: Before Merger
Related Unrelated Test of Equality-  
Related vs. Unrelated
Target Mean -10.52% -10.45% 0.01
Median -20.98% -14.65% 1.52
Bidder Mean 9.37% 14.97% 0.64
Median -3.36% -5.01% 0.14
Portfolio Mean 3.66% 11.71% 1.10
Median -2.45% -3.51% 0.67
Panel B: After Merger
Related Unrelated Test of Equality 
Related vs. Unrelated
Combined Firn Mean -11.32% -25.81% 1.96**
Median -16.93% -23.09% 2.56*
Return Change Mean -14.98% -37.52% 2.21**
Median -14.11% -18.12% 2.37
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Table 13
Merger and Firms’ Characteristics
This table reports merger characteristics and description o f target and bidder firms in the fiscal year before 
the announcement and the bidder after the completion date.
Size of the transaction, the method of payment, and 4-week premia are obtained from M&A Roster.
Total assets, sales, debt to total assets ratio (DAT), EBIT to sales ratio (EBIT/Sales), capital expenditures to 
sales ratio (CAPX/Sales), and dividend yield (DivYld) are obtained from COMPUSTAT active and 
research files.
Panel A: Characteristics of Merger Transactions









Method of Payment 
(Number of Firms)
Cash 75 (37%) 17(35%)
Stock 108 (54%) 19(41%)
Cash and Stock 19(9%) 10 (24%)
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Table 13 (Continued)
Panel B: Firms’ Characteristics
Fiscal Year before Merger 
Announcement Date
Fiscal Year after Merger 
Completion Date
Firm Target Bidder Combined Firm





Mean 428.24 486.29 2362.39 3808.03 3929.05 5562.41




Mean 459.13 587.16 2523.30 3853.04 3443.75 5423.53
Median 118.08 131.16 512.95 857.46 977.27 1598.03
EBIT/Sales
(Percent)
Mean -15.07 -11.35 -5.75 10.87 7.40 5.63
median 5.94 9.01 9.69 10.25 8.34 8.40
CAPX/Sales
(Percent)
Mean 11.19 13.87 16.00 17.61 13.04 11.21
Median 4.63 4.80 5.44 4.47 4.75 4.46
DivYld
Mean 0.52 0.37 0.85 0.93 0.85 1.24
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.33
DAT
(Percent)
Mean 26.11 23.66 22.89 27.57 27.38 34.84
Median 24.11 22.12 19.68 26.74 25.03 31.54
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Table 14 
Regression of Changes of Abnormal Returns on Pre-Merger Targets’ and Bidders’ 
Returns and on Firms’ and Mergers’ Characteristics
We estimate the following regression:
Ri = at + b-'Xi +c,- DDUMi + eit 
Ri is the post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns minus pre-merger buy-and-hold returns on value- 
weighted portfolio of target and bidder. DDUM is the dummy variable that equals to 1 if merger is 
unrelated and 0 otherwise. X; is the vector of firms’ and mergers’ characteristics that includes the following 
variables: TRET (-1) -  targets’ pre-merger annual abnormal buy-and-hold returns, BRET (-1) - bidders’ 
pre-merger annual abnormal buy-and-hold returns, TDAT (-1) -  targets’ debt ratio in the fiscal year before 
the merger, BDAT (-1) -  bidders’ debt ratio in the fiscal year before the merger, BDAT -  bidders’ debt 
ratio in the fiscal year after the merger, 
t-values are reported in parenthesis.
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Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Value-Weighted Portfolios of Target and Bidder 
Firms before the Merger
10.00%
8 .00%  - -
6 .00%  - -
4.00% --
2 .00%  - -
0 .00%
Month Relative to  the Announcement Month
-2 .00%
-15 -14 -13 -12 -10
-0.48% 0.16% 0.50% 1.00% 1.84% 1.47% 3.05% 3.82% 4.61%Related 4.42% 3.47% 3.24%
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Four-Factor Time-Series Regressions for Monthly Excess Returns for Portfolios of Domestic and Geographically Diversified Firms, and Returns on the Zero- 
Investment Portfolios
RiD-  Rf= a, + bi(R,„ -  Rf) + s, SMB + hi HML+ mi MOMENTUM + e, (1)
RiG-  Rf = SH + bifRm -  Rf) + s; SMB + hL HML+ m, MOMENTUM + e, (2)
RiG-R iD= ai + bi(Rm-R f) + SiSMB+hiHML+miM OM ENTUM +  Ei (3)
R °  -  Rf are the monthly excess returns on value-weighted portfolios of domestic firms. R jG -  Rf are the monthly excess returns on value-weighted portfolios o f  geographically diversified 
firms. Firms are sorted into two portfolios -Domestic or Geographically diversified according to their reported percent o f  foreign sales (COMPUSTAT item TFSALEP). Firms that report 
foreign sales greater than 10% of the total sales are classified as geographically diversified. Portfolios are formed on July 1a o f each year in the 1981-1999 period and held for 12 months. I f  a 
firm stops trading during the year, its returns are replaced by the mean returns o f the remaining portfolio. Returns on portfolios are calculated using CRSP. R jG-  R|D are the returns on the 
zero-investment portfolios formed by taking a long position in the portfolio o f geographically diversified firms and short position in the portfolio o f domestic firms on July 1st each year in the 
1981 -1 9 9 9  period and held for 12 months. Rf are the monthly Treasury bill rate. (Rm-  Rf) are the value-weighted excess market returns on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms. SMB (small 
minus big) is the difference each month between the returns on small firms and big firms. HML (high minus low) is the difference each month between return on a portfolio o f  high book-to- 
market stocks and the return on a portfolio o f low book-to-market stocks. MOMENTUM is the a momentum factor, constructed from six value-weight portfolios formed using independent 
sorts on size and prior return of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. It is the average o f the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios minus the average o f the returns on 
two low prior return portfolios. Prior return is measured from month -12 to -2. All returns are in percent.
Factors are obtained from K. French web page.
Regressions are performed for the whole time period 07/1981-06/2001 and two sub-periods corresponding to 1980s and 1990s.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Returns are in percent.
Domestic Firms 
(1)




















































































































Four-Factor Time-Series Regressions for Monthly Excess Returns (in Percent) for Portfolios of Industrially and Geographically Diversified, and Returns on 
the Zero-Investment Portfolios
Regressions are performed for the whole time period 07/1981-06/2001 (Panel A) and two sub-periods corresponding to 1980s and 1990s (Panels B and C respectively). We perform 
regression analysis on the portfolios formed on the two independent sorts -  according to their geographic diversification and the industrial diversification. See Table 1 for description o f 
industrial diversification portfolio formation scheme and Table 4 for description o f geographic diversification portfolio formation scheme.
Zero-investment portfolios are:
Ris-  RiM= a, + bi(R,„-Rf) + s, SMB + h  HML + mi MOMENTUM + e, (1)
RiG-  R,d= a, + bi(R„- Rf) + SiSMB + h,HML+ mi MOMENTUM + ej (2)
The F(GRS) statistic is calculated as follows:
F(GRS) = (A’ X -1 A)(N -  K  -  L + 1)/(L * (N -  K)*w), 
where N is the number o f time series observations, L is the number o f regressions (4 in our case), K  is 1 plus the number o f explanatory variables in the regression, A is the column vector o f  4 
regression intercepts, 2  (L x L) is the covariance matrix o f the residuals from 4 regressions, and w is the diagonal element o f (X’X) 1 corresponding to the intercept. F(GRS) has an F- 
distribution with L and (N -  K -  L +1) degrees o f freedom under the assumption that the returns and explanatory variables are normal and the true intercepts are 0 (Gibbons, Ross, and 
Shanken, 1989).
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: 07/1981 -  06/2001,240 Months__________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A l: Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms Zero-Investment Portfolio (2)
a b s h m Adj.
RJ
a b s h 111 Adj.
RJ




























































Zero-Investment Portfolio (1) 0.12 -0.04 0.12’ ** -0.31*’ * 0 .12*** 0.33 0.17 -0.03 0.24*** -0.34*** 0 .11** 0.31 F(GRS) x2













Panel A2: Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
a b s h m Adj.
R2
a b s h m Adj.
R2
































































Zero-Investment Portfolio (1) 0.29* -0 .11** 0.10* _0 44*** 0.05 0.26 0.13 -0.02 0 .20*** -0 34*** 0 .10* 0.32 F (GRS) x2













Panel B: 07/1981 -06/1991, 120 Months
Panel B l: Firm s Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms Zero-Investment Portfolio (2)
a b s h m Adj.
R2
a b s h m Adj.
R2
































































Zero-Investment Portfolio (1 ) 0.12 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 -0.21*** 0.08 F(GRS) t
(0.73) (-1-42) (-1.00) (0.20) (1-03) (-0.46) (-0.22) (1.60) (-0.26) (-3.27) 3.22** 9.24-*
Panel B2: Firms Classified by 2-digit SIC Code
a b s h m Adj.
R2
a b s h m Adj.
R2


































































































Panel C: 07/1991 -  06/2001,120 Months
Panel C l: Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms Zero-Investment Portfolio (2)
a b s h m Adj.
R2
a b s h m Adj.
R2
































































Zero-Investment Portfolio (1) -0.12 0.11** 0.17*** -0.35*** 0.13*** 0.63 0.37 0.02 0.19*** -0.46*** 0.21*** 0.52 F(GRS) ■i
(-0.63) (2.12) (3-41) (-5.67) (3.63) (1.38) (0.22) (2.62) (-5.00) (4.01) 3.50*** 9.85**
Panel C2: Firms Classified by 4-digit SIC Code
a b h m Adj.
R2
a b s h m Adj.
R2
































































Zero-Investment Portfolio (1) -0.04 0.10 0.18*** -0.52*** 0.01 0.58 0.25 0.04 0.16** -0.44*** 0.18*** 0.49 F (GRS) x2




Regressions and F(GRS) of Excess Stock Returns on 36 portfolios Formed on Size, Book-to-market, Industrial, 
and Geographic Diversification of Four Factors.
All firms in our sample are independently sorted into portfolios according to the industrial and geographic 
diversification (See Table 3 for details). Next, firms are independently allocated into portfolios according to their size 
(market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year) and book-to-market ratios (at the end of the previous fiscal 
year). Firms with the market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year in the lowest two quintiles are 
classified as “Small”, in the upper two quintiles are classified as “Large”, the middle 20 percent are the “Medium”. 
Book-to-market classification is done in the same manner. The intersection of these classifications (industrial and 
geographic diversification, size and book-to-market) result in 36 portfolios, 9 portfolios per each diversification 
classification.
We run the four-factor regression (see Tables 4, 5 and 6 for details) on each of these 36 portfolios and compute the 
F(GRS) statistic for each diversification category.
F ( G R S )  ~ ( A ’ £  l  A ) ( N - K - L  +  1 ) /( L  * ( N - K ) * w ) ,  
where N is the number of time series observations, L is the number of regressions (9 per each diversification category), 
K is 1 plus the number of explanatory variables in the regression, A is the column vector of 4 regression intercepts, £ 
(L x L) is the covariance matrix of the residuals from 4 regressions, and w is the diagonal element of (X’X)'1 
corresponding to the intercept. F(GRS) has an F-distribution with L and (N -  K -  L +1) degrees of freedom under the 
assumption that the returns and explanatory variables are normal and the true intercepts are 0 (Gibbons, Ross, and 
Shanken, 1989).
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel A: 07/1981 -  06/2001,240 Months
Panel A l:  Single-Segment Firms
Domestic Firms Geographically D iversified Firms
Size/































































































































































































F (GRS) 3.21*** 2.33**
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel A2: Multi-Segment Firms
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms
Size/































































































































































































F (GRS) 2.46** 1.44
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel B: 07/1981 -  06/1991,120 Months
Panel B l:  Single-Segment Firms
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms
Size/































































































































































































F (GRS) 2.80*** 1.01
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel B2: Multi-Segment Firms
Domestic Firms Geographically Diversified Firms
Size/































































































































































































F (GRS) 1.66 2.46**
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel C: 07/1991 -  06/2001, 120 Months
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Table 8 (Continued)
Panel C2: Multi-Segment Firms
Size/
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Table 9
Average Slopes from Monthly Fama-McBeth Regressions for Individual Stocks.
For each month in the sample period, from July 1981 to June 2001, the following regression is estimated:
Rt = «/ + b/Xi+ci Di + ei,
where, Ri are the monthly raw returns o f each stock. Xi is the vector o f firms’ characteristics that includes the following variables: 
BM -log o f book-to-market ratio in the previous fiscal year. SIZE -  log o f market capitalization at the end of month t (-2). PRICE -  
log o f price reciprocal at the end o f month t(-2). DVOL -  the dollar volume of trading in the month t (-2). It is approximated by stock 
price at the end o f month t(-2) multiplied by share volume in month t(-2). DIVYLD -  the ratio o f dividends in the previous fiscal year 
to market capitalization at the calendar year end (not in logs). RET6 -  Compounded gross returns for months t(-6) through t (-2). 
RET12 -  Compounded gross returns for months t(-12) and t (-2). CAPX/SALES -  is the ratio o f  capital expenditures to sales in the 
previous fiscal year. EBIT/SALES - is the ratio o f earnings before interest and taxes to sales in the previous fiscal year. DAT -  the 
debt ratio in the previous fiscal year. D, is the vector o f  variables that captures industrial and geographic diversification: INDDUM -  
industrial diversification dummy. GEODUM -  geographic diversification dummy. We follow the method o f Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) and estimate the above regression separately for each month. Next, we calculate the mean and the t-statistics o f  the monthly 
coefficient estimates for the entire period from July 1981 to June 2001 (240 months), and for two sub-periods corresponding to 1980s 
and 1990s. Regression 3 is run for the single-segment firms and regression 4 - for multi-segment firms. The last column represents the 
difference between the average slopes o f single-segment firms and the average slopes o f multi-segment firms. Time series statistics 
are in parenthesis.
*. **. *** denote significance at 10%. 5%  and 1% level. ___________________________________________________
Panel A: 07/1981 -  06/2001,240 Months
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.54 0.55 0.23 1.15* -0.92***
(0.85) (0.85) (0.35) (1.76) (-2.68)
BM 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.36*** -0.03
(4.36) (4.35) (4.17) (4.11) (-0.40)
SIZE 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.15**
(4.43) (4.42) (4.93) (3.29) (2.39)
PRICE J J9*** I 19*** 1.28*** 0.89*** 0.40***
(9.24) (9.23) (9.32) (7.82) (4.96)
DVOL -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 0.02
(-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-1.44) (0.36)
RET6 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01* -0.00
(1.88) (1.82) (1.11) (1.74) (-1.00)
RET12 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*
(7.76) (7.74) (8.45) (4.82) (1.69)
DIVYIELD 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01
(1.59) (1.58) (1.21) (1.34) (-0.34)
CAPX/SALE -0.69*** -0.69*** -0.57*** -0.94*** 0.37
(-3.54) (-3.53) (-2.90) (-2.60) (1.12)
EBIT/SALE 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.41 1.73*** -1.32***
(2.47) (2.48) (1.30) (3.24) (-2.61)
DAT -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00
(-4.59) (-4.70) (-4.59) (-3.07) (-1.59)
GEODUM 0.14** 0.13 0.10 0.15* 0.01
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Table 9 (Continued)
Panel B: 07/1981 -  06/1991, 120 Months
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.95 0.97 0.75 0.91 -0.16
(1.17) (1.19) (0.88) (1.09) (-0.38)
BM 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.01
(4.33) (4.33) (4.10) (3.47) (0.05)
SIZE 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.10
(3.66) (3.64) (3.98) (2.83) (1.17)
PRICE 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.64*** 0.51*** 0.13**
(8.41) (8.42) (8.53) (6.01) (1.96)
DVOL -0.16** -0.16** -0.17** -0.16* -0.02
(-1.95) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.80) (-0.26)
R E T 6 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01*
(0.25) (0.25) (-0.94) (1.08) (-1.85)
R E T 12 0.01*** 0 .01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01**
(5.70) (5.73) (6.38) (3.04) (2.29)
DIVYIELD 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 0.06** -0.02
(1.64) (1.62) (1.14) (1.93) (-1.14)
CAPX/SALE -1.08*** -1.08*** -0.78*** -2.11*** 1.33***
(-3.78) (-3.78) (-2.90) (-3.98) (2.75)
EBIT/SALE 1.00** 1.00** 0.36 2.71*** -2.34***
(2.17) (2.19) (0.73) (3.64) (-3.15)
DAT -0.01*** -0 .01*** -0.01*** -0 .01*** -0.00
(-3.45) (-3.69) (-3.03) (-2.86) (-0.40)
OEODUM 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.14 -0.22*
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Table 9 (Continued)
Panel C: 07/1991 -  06/2001, 120 Months
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 0.14 0.12 -0.29 1.39 -1.68***
(0.14) (0.12) (-0.29) (1.38) (-3.14)
BM 0.28** 0.28** 0.27** 0.34** -0.07
(2.30) (2.30) (2.12) (2.46) (-0.64)
SIZE 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.57*** 0.36** 0.21**
(3.01) (3.01) (3.37) (2.10) (2.14)
PRICE 1.78*** 1.77*** 1.93*** 1.27*** 0.66***
(7.54) (7.53) (7.64) (6.17) (4.68)
DVOL -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.06
(-0.22) (-0 .22) (-0.16) (-0.58) (0.70)
R E T 6 0.01*** 0.01** 0 .01*** 0.01 0.00
(2.50) (2.43) (2.60) (1.36) (0.37)
RET_12 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00
(5.27) (5.22) (5.60) (3.80) (-0.23)
DIVYIELD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.37) (0.37) (0.45) (0 .01) (0.32)
CAPX/SALE -0.30 -0.30 -0.36 0.23 -0.59
(-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.26) (0.49) (-1.36)
EBIT/SALE 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.75 -0.30
(1.24) (1.23) (1-17) (0.99) (-0.45)
DAT -0 .01*** -0 .01*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01*
(-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.48) (-1.81) (-1.80)
GEODUM 0.26** 0.30** 0.28** 0.16 0.12
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Table 10
Average Slopes from Monthly Fama-McBeth Regressions for Surviving Firms.
This sample contains only firms that were present in the market in 1980. No new firms are added to the portfolios. If  a firm exits the 
sample it is not replaced. For each month in the sample period, from July 1981 to June 2001, the following regression is estimated: 
R i -  ai + biXi +ci D, + a ,
where, Ri are the monthly raw returns o f each stock. X, is the vector o f firms’ characteristics and D jis the vector o f variables that 
captures industrial and geographic diversification (see Table 9 for variables description).
Regression 3 is performed for the single-segment firms and regression 4 - for multi-segment firms. The last column represents the 
difference between the average slopes o f single-segment firms and the average slopes o f multi-segment firms. Time series statistics 
are in parenthesis.
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Panel A: 07/1981 -  06/2001, 240 Months
Regression 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 1.44** 1.45** 1.40** 1.18* 0.23
2.32 2.32 2.21 1.64 0.46
BM 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.40*** -0.12
3.70 3.69 2.8 3.69 -0.96
SIZE 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* 0.18 -0.01
1.76 1.76 1.77 1.53 -0.1
PRICE 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.75*** -0.05
8.28 8.29 7.6 6.51 -0.42
DVOL -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
-0.31 -0.31 -0.33 -0.17 -0.12
RET_6 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
-0.09 -0.08 -0.45 -0.01 -0.33
R E T 12 0.01*** 0 .01*** 0 .01*** 0.01*** 0.01
4.36 4.35 4.9 2.75 0.86
DIVYIELD 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.03
0.90 0.88 0.36 1.33 -1.13
CAPX/SALE -1.20*** -1 19*** -0.92* -1.68*** 0.76
-2.62 -2,59 -1.64 -2.51 1.00
EBIT/SALE 2.02*** 2 .01*** 1.38* 2.64*** -1.26
3.42 3.41 1.78 3.35 -1.25
DAT -0 .01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** 0.01
-3.01 -3.01 -1.96 -2.71 0.95
GEODUM 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.03
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Table 10 (Continued)
Panel B: 07/1981 -  06/1991, 120 Months
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 1.23 1.30 1.45* 0.67 0.78
1.55 1.61 1.77 0.78 1.54
BM 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.31** 0.47*** -0.16
3.39 3.37 2.33 3.70 -1.17
SIZE 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.24** 0.05
2.61 2.54 2.91 2.02 0.56
PRICE 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.59*** 0.40*** 0.19**
6.38 6.39 7.15 4.17 2.34
DVOL -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.03
-1.53 -1.50 -1.60 -1.18 -0.39
R E T 6 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
-0.18 -0.17 -0.40 -0.54 0.23
R E T 12 0 .01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00
3.77 3.74 3.97 2.58 0.50
DIVYIELD 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05* -0.03
1.11 1.10 0.63 1.63 -1.29
CAPX/SALE -1.73*** -1.72*** -1.25** -2.44*** 1.19*
-3.19 -3.16 -2.15 -3.09 1.61
EBIT/SALE 2.18*** 2.20*** 1.46* 3.24*** -1.77*
3.16 3.18 1.72 3.71 -1.73
DAT -0 .01*** -0.01*** -0 .01*** -0.01*** 0.00
-3.31 -3.37 -2.80 -2.86 0.06
GEODUM 0.01 -0.12 -0.15 0.12 -0.27*
0.13 -0.91 -1.10 0.99 -1.76
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Table 10 (Continued)
Panel C: 07/1991 -0 6 /2 0 0 1 ,1 2 0 Months----- ---- ----
Regression 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 1.65* 1.60* 1.35 1.68 -0.32
1.72 1.67 1.39 1.46 -0.37
BM 0.26** 0.26** 0.26* 0.33* -0.07
1.96 1.97 1.68 1.88 -0.36
SIZE 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.12 -0.07
0.45 0.48 0.32 0.60 -0.39
PRICE 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.82*** 1.11*** -0.29
6.12 6.14 4.94 5.37 -1.33
DVOL 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.01
0.55 0.53 0.60 0.42 0.06
R E T 6 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
0.03 0.04 -0.26 0.43 -0.58
R E T 12 0.01*** 0 .01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
2.54 2.54 3.09 1.51 0.70
DIVYIELD 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.03
0.32 0.3 -0.00 0.58 -0.62
CAPX/SALE -0.67 -0.65 -0.59 -0.91 0.32
-0.91 -0.89 -0.61 -0.84 0.24
EBIT/SALE 1.85** 1.82* 1.30 2.05 -0.76
1.93 1.90* 0.99 1.56 -0.43
DAT -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
-1.46 -1.43 -0.46 -1.58 1.04
GEODUM 0.21* 0.29* 0.25 0.04 0.20
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